Atomic Energy of Canada Limited National Research Universal Reactor Safety System Upgrades and the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission's Licensing and Oversight Process

Appendix A- Independent Review Team Charters

CNSC: Independent Review Team Charter; Statement of Work

1.0 Background

The Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission (CNSC) has adopted a continuous improvement culture that includes transparent reporting of results and performance evaluations based on lessons learned.

The CNSC will undertake a review of lessons learned stemming from the Atomic Energy of Canada Limited (AECL) decision to shut down the National Research Universal (NRU) reactor in order to complete safety upgrades. This review will aim to develop a concise overview of key findings, and was committed to by Mr. Barclay Howden, Director General of the CNSC Nuclear Cycle and Facilities Regulation Directorate during the December 6, 2007 meeting of the CNSC Tribunal.

2.0 Objectives

The purpose of this review is to:

Examine the performance of CNSC staff over the period leading up to and pursuant to the Commission Tribunal decision to renew the NRU licence (thus allowing the NRU to remain operational), as well as the subsequent period leading up to AECL's decision to shut down the NRU; and identify recommendations for improvements in CNSC performance.

3.0 Scope of Work

• Clearly identify the current regulatory basis for licensing the NRU, CNSC staff recommendations to the Commission, and the approved safety case as it relates to the two-pump backup configuration. This review should include how the licensing basis was determined;
• Review elements of the 2006 NRU licence renewal: Commission Member Documents and supporting information (including safety system upgrade documentation), transcripts, minutes and Records of Decision, and other applicable documentation;
• Investigate how compliance was enforced with regards to the emergency power supply and other safety system upgrades;
• Identify the nature, frequency and quality of communication among CNSC staff, AECL, and any other stakeholders on NRU safety upgrade requirements, and progress of work from 2005 and beyond; and
• Ascertain the nature and extent of consultations between AECL and CNSC staff on the work plan (including timelines) to carry out these upgrades, with emphasis on the emergency power system.

4.0 Tasks to be performed

A team of 3 Talisman consultants will perform the work identified in this scope. They will be supported by CNSC staff as needed. The CNSC core support team will include a project coordinator and a technical writer.

The consultants shall review all pertinent background documents, including, but not limited to:

• Technical documents related to NRU licensing matters, including licence amendments allowing for extended NRU operations, and CNSC staff follow-up on required AECL actions;
• Information submitted in support of the licence application as issued August 2006, including safety cases submitted by AECL and the results of CNSC staff reviews of this material;
• Commission hearing transcripts, Records of Decision and Commission Member Documents;
• Meeting notes or correspondence, specifically with respect to the requirement and planning for connection/commissioning of the two main heavy water pumps to the NRU's emergency power system; and
• Information and compliance findings in support of NRU reactor continued operation.

Interviews of CNSC staff members involved in the NRU file and in activities proceeding and subsequent to the 2006 licence renewal shall be conducted. Subjects will include project officers and managers in the Chalk River Licensing Division; the facility site supervisor and inspectors; members of the CNSC Legal Services Unit; and members of the CNSC Executive.

External interviews with industry members and academia may be required and will be determined at a later date.

AECL: Independent Review Team Charter; Statement of Work

1.0 Background

Atomic Energy of Canada Limited (AECL) has adopted a continuous improvement culture that includes transparent reporting of results and performance evaluations based on lessons learned.

AECL will undertake a review of lessons learned stemming from the extended outage of AECL's National Research Universal (NRU) reactor in November and December of 2007. This review will aim to develop a concise overview of key findings, and was committed to by Mr. Brian McGee, Senior Vice-President and AECL's Chief Nuclear Officer, during the December 6, 2007 meeting of the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission (CNSC) Tribunal, and reinforced at the January 9, 2008 meeting of the CNSC Tribunal.

The CNSC had previously engaged Talisman to carry out a review focused on the CNSC. AECL and the CNSC have now agreed that the Talisman review will cover both organizations, and will result in a single final report that will include recommendations for improvement for both parties.

2.0 Objectives

The purpose of this review is to:

Examine the performance of AECL staff over the period leading up to and pursuant to the Commission Tribunal decisions to amend the Chalk River licence in late 2005 (thus allowing the NRU to remain operational) and to renew the Chalk River site licence in 2006, as well as the subsequent period leading up to the extended outage of NRU in late 2007; and identify recommendations for improvements in performance.

3.0 Scope of Work

• Clearly identify the current regulatory basis for licensing the NRU, CNSC staff recommendations to the Commission, and the approved safety case, as it relates to the two-pump backup configuration. This review should include how the licensing basis was determined;
• Review elements of the 2006 NRU licence renewal: Commission Member Documents and supporting information (including safety system upgrade documentation), transcripts, minutes and Records of Decision, and other applicable documentation;
• Investigate how compliance was enforced regarding the emergency power supply and other safety system upgrades;
• Identify the nature, frequency and quality of communication among CNSC staff, AECL, and any other stakeholders on NRU safety upgrade requirements and progress of work from 2005 and beyond;
• Ascertain the nature and extent of consultations between AECL and CNSC staff on the work plan (including timelines) to carry out these upgrades, with emphasis on the emergency power system and connection of the two pumps to EPS;
• Review the clarity provided to AECL in licensing requirements, with respect to the scope and breadth of the upgrades, and make recommendations for improved clarity in licensing requirements;
• Review AECL's management of the safety upgrades, with specific focus on the Emergency Power System and the two pumps in question (MHWP's 104 and 105), during the period prior to December 31, 2005, relative to the licence condition to have the upgrades fully operational by that date, and subsequent to that date - up to the start of the extended outage in late 2007;
• Determine whether there were viable options available to AECL and the CNSC, in November and December 2007, which could have avoided or shortened the unplanned extended outage of NRU.

4.0 Tasks to be Performed

A team of 3 Talisman consultants will perform the work identified in this scope. They will be supported by AECL staff as needed. AECL's senior single point of contact for this work is Mr. G. H. Archinoff, Vice-President, Compliance, Corporate Oversight and Regulatory Affairs. Talisman's senior single point of contact will be Mr. H. Thompson.

The consultants shall review all pertinent background documents including, but not limited to:

• Documents related to NRU licensing matters, including licence amendments allowing for extended NRU operations, and CNSC staff follow-up on required AECL actions;
• Information submitted in support of the licence application, as issued in August 2006, including safety cases submitted by AECL and the results of CNSC staff reviews of this material;
• Commission hearing transcripts, Records of Decision and Commission Member Documents;
• Meeting notes, correspondence and AECL internal documentation specifically, with respect to the requirement and planning for connection/commissioning of the two main heavy water pumps to the NRU's emergency power system; and
• Information and compliance findings in support of the NRU's continued operation.

Interviews of AECL staff members involved in the NRU file and in activities preceding and subsequent to the 2006 licence renewal shall be conducted. Subjects will include past and present members of the NRU management team, members of the Chalk River Leadership Team, CRL licensing staff, and other AECL staff with relevant knowledge, to be identified by the AECL contact. Talisman should also interview individuals outside of AECL, including CNSC staff, as necessary to meet the objectives of this work.