

Minutes of the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission (CNSC) Meeting held Wednesday, November 17, 2004 beginning at 1:00 p.m. in the Public Hearing Room, CNSC Offices, 280 Slater Street, Ottawa, Ontario.

Present:

L.J. Keen, Chair

C.R. Barnes

J. Dosman

A. Graham

M.J. McDill

M. Taylor

M.A. Leblanc, Secretary

J. Lavoie, General Counsel

S. Gingras, Recording Secretary

CNSC staff advisers were: I. Grant, K. Lafrenière, G. Schwarz, G. Moriarty, H. Rabski, K. Scissons, J. Mecke, G. Lamarre, A. Alwani, K. Klassen, R. Barker, R. Stenson, and T. Schaubel.

Other contributors were:

- New Brunswick Power: W. Thériault
- Ontario Power Generation Inc.: G. Smith, J. Froats, I. Malek, K. Nash and H. Morrison, T. Mitchell and M. Williams
- Atomic Energy of Canada Limited: J.P. Letourneau, B. Shorter and B. Gerenstein

Adoption of the Agenda

1. The revised agenda, CMD 04-M41.A, was adopted as presented.

Chair and Secretary

2. The President chaired the meeting of the Commission, assisted by M. A. Leblanc, Secretary and S. Gingras, Recording Secretary.

Constitution

3. With the notice of meeting having been properly given and a quorum of Commission Members being present, the meeting was declared to be properly constituted.

4. Since the meeting of the Commission held September 17, 2004, Commission Member Documents CMD 04-M40 to CMD 04-M48.1A were distributed to Members. These documents are further detailed in Annex A of these minutes.

Minutes of the CNSC Meeting Held September 17, 2004

5. The Members approved the minutes of the September 17, 2004 Commission meeting (reference CMD 04-M42) without change.

Significant Development Report

6. Significant Development Report (SDR) no. 2004-06 (CMDs 04-M43 and 04-M43A) was submitted by staff. The following information was added orally during the meeting.
7. With reference to section 4.1.1 in CMD 04-M43, staff reported that, on November 6, 2004, the Bruce A NGS Unit 4 shutdown system No. 1 activated when an operator accidentally left a valve open following a routine safety system test on shutdown system No. 2. Unit 4 has since been returned to service and is presently operating at full power.
8. Also with reference to section 4.1.1 in CMD 04-M43, staff reported that, on November 10, 2004, Bruce B Unit 8 was shut down by automatic and manual actions due to a valving error in the screen house which caused the turbine to lose vacuum. Unit 8 has since been returned to service and is presently operating at full power.
9. In response to the Commission's questions on the causes of the above-noted recent events at the Bruce NGS (including any deficiencies in safety culture or quality assurance), staff stated that the root cause analyses are not yet complete and that an assessment of safety culture issues will form part of those analyses.
10. With reference to item 4.1.1.1 in CMD 04-M43 concerning the International Atomic Energy Agency's discovery of a non-functional fuel bundle counter at the Bruce NGS, the Commission enquired as to whether Bruce Power would have been previously aware of the problem. In response, staff stated that Bruce Power, while not directly supervising the safeguards equipment, is required to promptly report any known failures of safeguards equipment to the CNSC.
11. With reference to item 4.1.1.2 in CMD 04-M43 concerning a leak of non-radioactive chemically treated water to Lake Huron from

- Bruce B Unit 7, the Commission sought further details on the amount of water released and its level of toxicity to biota. Staff answered that the volume of the leak was not significant, and that the principal contaminant, hydrogen, was well below allowable limits set by the CNSC and the Ontario Ministry of the Environment.
12. With reference to item 4.1.2.3 in CMD 04-M43 concerning the discovery of significant cracks in the west condenser steam discharge valve dump header at the Point Lepreau NGS, the Commission asked when this equipment had been last inspected. In response, NB Power reported that this equipment had been inspected, but not as part of a regular inspection program. NB Power stated that it has expanded its inspection program to include areas where similar failures could occur.
 13. In response to a follow-up question from the Commission on the steam condenser system inspection requirements, staff reported that NB Power had been inspecting the system in accordance with the applicable industrial standards and that the system was in compliance with the requirements of the New Brunswick Safety Code Services who oversees boiler and pressure-vessel equipment safety in the province.
 14. The Commission questioned staff further on the risk that the cracks in the piping posed. In response, staff stated that a pipe failure would have been a very significant event. However, staff added that no radiation would have been released and the reactor would have automatically shutdown safely.
 15. In response to the Commission's questions on the planned follow-up to this event, staff stated that it expects the matter will be addressed in NB Power's Operational Experience Program, and that all relevant information will be shared with the other power reactor licensees. Staff noted that it has already requested Ontario Power Generation and Hydro Quebec to demonstrate how their inspection programs will adequately address this issue at their facilities.
 16. With reference to item 4.1.2.2 in CMD 04-M43 concerning the frequency control problems at the Point Lepreau NGS emergency power diesel generator No. 2, the Commission sought further information on how this was corrected. In response, NB Power answered that it conducts more frequent inspections of the diesel generator and that a second backup portable generator was installed. NB Power noted that a third generator was also procured

and that it is scheduled to be in service by early December 2004. Staff indicated its satisfaction with NB Power's response to this issue.

17. With reference to item 4.1.3 concerning openings in steam protected rooms at the Darlington NGS that are greater than the allowable size in the safety analysis, staff informed the Commission that all inspections and repairs have been completed by Ontario Power Generation (OPG). Concerning the related outages, Units 1, 2 and 4 are now operating at high power and Unit 3 is in the process of returning to service.
18. In response to the Commission's questions on the nature and origins of the openings, OPG explained that it originally believed it had addressed the problem in 2002 when a number of gaps in the rooms had been sealed. OPG stated that it later discovered a number of very small openings that were difficult to detect, but which when taken together, exceeded the allowable total size of opening in particular rooms. OPG described the different types of openings and measures taken to seal them. OPG explained that, in 2004, more than 200 additional personnel, exerting more than 200 000 person-hours, was used to find and repair openings. Mitigation measures were also put in place. OPG considers that this rigorous process was an important opportunity for the organization to demonstrate to its employees the importance of safety culture at the facility. CNSC staff expressed its satisfaction with how OPG has resolved the problem.
19. In response to the Commission's questions on whether similar gaps in the steam-protected rooms could exist at other Canadian power reactor stations, staff explained that the locating of critical equipment in steam-protected rooms is a design feature unique to the Darlington plant. At the other stations, the equipment itself is environmentally qualified.
20. In response to a question from the Commission about the safety risks associated with this issue, staff stated that, although it is of the view that the defects discovered were significant, it believes that the public remained well protected and that the risks remained low at all times.
21. With reference to item 4.1.4 concerning a mine-water pipeline break and spill at the Cluff Lake Project, the Commission enquired as to whether other joints in the pipeline were at risk of rupturing and if further inspections of the pipeline were planned. Staff responded that COGEMA is conducting a thorough follow-up to

- the incident, including a complete inspection of the mine-water lines and related equipment. The response is considered acceptable by CNSC staff.
22. With reference to item 4.1.5 on Millardair contamination and cleanup at Pearson Airport, the Commission sought further information of the circumstances under which this contamination was discovered and the risks that it poses. CNSC staff stated that the contaminated room and unqualified owner were identified during a follow-up investigation under the *Contaminated Lands Evaluation and Assessment Network (CLEAN)* program. Staff also reported that the room is presently locked and unoccupied and poses no significant risk to the public.
23. Staff will provide the Commission with a further update on the contamination at the former Millardair operation in the Significant Development Report at the Commission meeting scheduled for February 2005.
24. With reference to item 4.1.7 on fuel uncovered in a refueling flask at Atomic Energy of Canada's NRU reactor at Chalk River Laboratories, the Commission questioned how it was that the fuel rod was left in the fuel rod flask barrel. In response, AECL stated that a full-scale root cause investigation is scheduled to be completed by January 2005.
25. CNSC staff committed to present to the Commission an update to this Significant Development Report as soon as practical following the completion of the root cause analysis.
26. With reference to item 4.1.8 on the small loss of coolant event at AECL's NRU reactor pressurized experimental loop, the Commission sought further information on the cause of the event and the planned corrective actions. In response, AECL stated that it discovered from its investigation that the failed valves were not part of an ongoing maintenance program. AECL also discovered that appropriate resources had not been directed to the assessment of the initial leak and to determine and carry out the required repair. Staff concurred with these findings of AECL and expressed concern about how they may reflect on the attitudes towards safety and quality assurance of some AECL staff. Staff also confirmed that AECL is pursuing an initiative to ensure that all facilities at the site are captured by a comprehensive preventative maintenance program.

ACTION

ACTION

27. The Commission requested AECL and CNSC staff to provide, at the January 2005 meeting of the Commission, a more detailed description of this event, including whether it constituted a serious process failure.

ACTION

Status Report on Power Reactors

28. With reference to the Status Report on Power Reactors (CMD 04-M44), staff provided the following update on the changes in status that have occurred since the report was issued:
- On November 10, 2004, Bruce NGS Unit 3 was shut down to repair leaks in the heat transport system.
 - At Pickering NGS Unit 5, the previously reported leak from the heat transport system valving packing was repaired and the unit has since returned to service.
 - Darlington NGS Units 1, 2 and 4 are now operating at high power and Unit 3 is currently in the process of returning to full power.

Mid-Term Licensing Report on OPG's Western Waste Management Facility

29. With reference to CMD 04-M45, staff provided the scheduled interim performance report on OPG's Western Waste Management Facility.
30. Staff reported that no safety significant items of non-compliance or events were identified during the review period. Staff assigned an overall "B" rating (meets requirements) to the facility.
31. Staff reported that all action items identified at the time of the last licence renewal are now complete.
32. The Commission questioned OPG on the Memorandum of Understanding that was reportedly signed between the Municipality of Kincardine and OPG concerning a plan for the long-term storage of low and intermediate waste at the Bruce site. In response, OPG stated that the project is at an early conceptual stage and that, if the residents of Kincardine indicate their acceptance of the proposal, OPG plans to proceed with the regulatory approval process. OPG further noted that one independent assessment report has confirmed that the project is technically feasible.

Status Report on Site Conditions and Progress on the Licensing Process of Waste Management Areas

33. With reference to CMD 04-M46, staff provided its third annual status report on site conditions and progress on the licensing of waste management areas owned by the Crown, historic contaminated lands, landfills and radium-luminescent devices. CNSC staff also provided a summary of activities conducted under the CLEAN program.
34. The Commission asked staff to elaborate on what is being done in response to the reported concerns of the residents of Tulita NWT, and their request to have a mound of contaminated material removed from their community. In response, staff stated that, because the mound does not pose a safety or health concern, the CNSC is not in a position to order its removal. However, CNSC staff indicated that a licensing process might be triggered if the Government of Canada decides to have the mound moved.

Landfill Sites Operated Under Federal, Provincial and Territorial Authority

35. CNSC staff recommended that the Commission, pursuant to section 7 of the *Nuclear Safety and Control Act* (NSCA), grant an indefinite exemption from CNSC licensing for possession, management and storage of nuclear substances at all landfill sites operated under provincial or federal authority. In making this recommendation, CNSC staff concluded that there are sufficient regulatory controls in place at those sites to adequately address any potential radiological risk associated with the disposal of relatively small quantities of nuclear substances at those sites. Referring to section 11 of the *General Nuclear Safety and Control Regulations*, which sets out the conditions under which the Commission may consider such an exemption, staff expressed the view that the exemption would not pose an unreasonable risk to the environment or the health and safety of persons, pose an unreasonable risk to national security, or result in a failure to achieve conformity with measures of control and international obligations to which Canada has agreed. Staff also advised the Commission that there is no requirement for a federal environmental assessment for the proposed exemption pursuant to the *Canadian Environmental Assessment Act* (CEAA) or the *Mackenzie Valley Resources Management Act* (MVRMA).
36. The Commission considered the staff's recommendation and, pursuant to section 7 of the *Nuclear Safety and Control Act*,

decided to exempt all landfill sites operated under federal, provincial and territorial authority from licensing for the possession, storage and management of nuclear substances. The exemption is for an indefinite period beginning January 1, 2005 (see Annex B).

DECISION

Devices Containing Radium Luminous Compounds

37. Staff reported that, while it continues to make progress in its program to identify and assess the risks associated with devices containing radium luminous compounds in Canada, there will not be sufficient time to complete its assessment before the current exemption from licensing pursuant to subsection 8(b) of the *Nuclear Substances and Radiation Devices Regulations* expires on December 31, 2004. Therefore, to allow time for the remaining assessment, CNSC staff recommended that the Commission extend the existing exemption for those devices for a period of one year. Referring to section 11 of the *General Nuclear Safety and Control Regulations*, staff expressed the view that the exemption would not pose an unreasonable risk to the environment or the health and safety of persons, pose an unreasonable risk to national security, or result in a failure to achieve conformity with measures of control and international obligations to which Canada has agreed. Staff also advised the Commission that there is no requirement for an environmental assessment for the proposal extension of the exemption pursuant to the CEA or the MVRMA.
38. The Commission considered the staff's recommendation and, pursuant to section 7 of the *Nuclear Safety and Control Act*, decided to extend the exemption of devices containing radium luminous compounds from licensing as specified in subsection 8(b) of the *Nuclear Substances and Radiation Devices Regulations*. The exemption is extended until December 31, 2005 (see Annex B).

DECISION

Status Report on Site Conditions and Progress of the Licensing Process for Unlicensed Uranium Tailings Management Sites

39. With reference to CMD 04-M47, staff provided its third annual status report on tailings management sites associated with the former operation of uranium mines in Canada, and on historic radium/uranium mines without tailings in Canada. The Commission requested annual reports on these exemptions at the time the Commission initially granted the exemptions in December 2001.

Lorado Idle Mine Site

40. With respect to the Lorado Idle Mine Site in Saskatchewan, staff reported that EnCana West Ltd. has been identified as the owner of the land on which a portion of the unconfined tailings from the Lorado milling operation exist, the remainder of the site being Provincial Crown land. Staff also reported that work to characterize the site is continuing. However, to allow the responsible parties sufficient time to complete their assessments, consider the options for remediation, address any requirements for environmental assessment under the CEAA, and apply for an appropriate licence under the NSCA, staff requested that the Commission extend the current exemption for a period of five years. Referring to section 11 of the *General Nuclear Safety and Control Regulations*, staff expressed the view that the proposed exemption would not pose an unreasonable risk to the environment or the health and safety of persons, pose an unreasonable risk to national security, or result in a failure to achieve conformity with measures of control and international obligations to which Canada has agreed. Staff also advised that there is no requirement for a federal environmental assessment of the proposed extension of the exemption pursuant to the CEAA.
41. The Commission questioned staff's rationale for the proposed five-year duration of the extension for the Lorado Idle mine site. In response, staff expressed the view that five years is a realistic time frame for completing the remaining, extensive pre-licensing activities and that, in the interim, the controls in place at the site will ensure that no unreasonable risks to the environment or persons arise in the meantime.
42. The Commission requests that staff maintain close oversight on both the process to complete the pre-licensing activities and the health and safety of the site. Any changes should be reported to the Commission.
43. The Commission considered the staff's recommendation and, pursuant to section 7 of the *Nuclear Safety and Control Act*, decided to extend the exemption from licensing for the possession, storage and management of nuclear substances at the Lorado Idle Mine Site until December 31, 2009 (see Annex B).

DECISIONBicroft Tailings Management Site

44. With respect to the Bicroft Tailings Management Site in Ontario, staff reported that Barrick Gold Inc. (Barrick) had requested an

extension to the current exemption from December 31, 2004 until December 31, 2005. The requested extension to the current exemption would allow Barrick to have the property transferred from its wholly-owned subsidiary Lac Properties Inc., and to allow for an updating of the environmental pathways analysis in support of a licence application. Staff added that it expects the application to also include a perpetual care and maintenance plan and an associated financial guarantee. Referring to section 11 of the *General Nuclear Safety and Control Regulations*, staff expressed the view that the exemption would not pose an unreasonable risk to the environment or to the health and safety of persons, pose an unreasonable risk to national security, or result in a failure to achieve conformity with measures of control and international obligations to which Canada has agreed. Staff further advised that there is no requirement for a federal environmental assessment under CEEA for the exemption request.

45. Staff committed to inform the Commission, through a Significant Development Report, if a Designated Officer issues a licence for the Bicroft site to Barrick.

ACTION

46. The Commission considered the staff's recommendation and, pursuant to section 7 of the *Nuclear Safety and Control Act*, decided to extend the exemption from licensing for the possession, storage and management of nuclear substances at the Bicroft Tailings Management Site until December 31, 2005 (see Annex B).

DECISION

Gunnar Idle Mine Site

47. With respect to the Gunnar Idle Mine site in Saskatchewan, staff reported that the Province of Saskatchewan was continuing to complete its due diligence investigation regarding ownership of the site and thus has not applied for a licence for this site. Staff added that, while it is satisfied that the risks to health, safety and the environment have been addressed with the work completed by the Province in September 2004, the mid- and long-term concerns for human and environmental health and safety remain. Staff further reported that, during the summer of 2004, the Government of Saskatchewan also commissioned a number of studies to help characterize the Gunnar site. Staff recommended that the Commission extend the current exemption from the requirement for a licence to possess, manage and store nuclear substances at the Gunnar Idle Mine, Mill and Tailings site for a period of five years. This would allow the Saskatchewan Government sufficient time to complete their due diligence investigations at the site and perform other necessary assessments, consultations and characterizations.

- Referring to section 11 of the *General Nuclear Safety and Control Regulations*, staff expressed the view that the exemption would not pose an unreasonable risk to the environment or the health and safety of persons, pose an unreasonable risk to national security, or result in a failure to achieve conformity with measures of control and international obligations to which Canada has agreed. Staff was also advised that there is no requirement for a federal environmental assessment for the proposed exemption pursuant to CEA.
48. The Commission questioned staff's rationale for the proposed five-year duration of the extension for the Gunnar Idle mine site. In response, staff expressed the view that five years is a realistic time frame for completing the remaining, extensive pre-licensing activities and that, in the interim, the controls in place at the site will ensure that no unreasonable risks to the environment or persons arise in the meantime.
49. While the Commission accepts that the exemption would not pose an unreasonable risk to the health and safety of persons or to the environment in the short term, the Commission shares staff's concern about the long-term safety of the site. Therefore, the Commission requires that staff maintain close oversight of the process underway in Saskatchewan on due diligence investigation regarding the ownership, to ensure that a license application is received as expeditiously as possible. In the event of a change in the process outlined in the CMD, staff should inform the Commission by a Significant Development Report. In addition, staff should inform the Commission of any changes in the site which will affect its assessment of the site's health and safety aspects.
50. The Commission considered the staff's recommendation and, pursuant to section 7 of the *Nuclear Safety and Control Act*, decided to extend the exemption from licensing for the possession, storage and management of nuclear substances the Gunnar Idle Mine, Mill and Tailings site until December 31, 2009 (see Annex B).

DECISION**Indore Idle Mine Site**

51. With respect to the Indore Idle Mine site in the Northwest Territories, staff reported that tailings may have been deposited in the adjacent Hottah Lake. Staff also noted that, while radiation fields on the site are slightly elevated, and that some conventional safety hazards exist, the site is very remote and visits to the area are

uncommon. Staff requested that the Commission issue an exemption from the requirement for a licence to possess, manage and store nuclear substances at the Indore Idle Mine site for a period ending December 31, 2007. This would provide staff and Indian and Northern Affairs Canada sufficient time to verify the bathymetry of the lake adjacent to the mine site, and to perform characterization of the impacts of any submerged tailings. Referring to section 11 of the *General Nuclear Safety and Control Regulations*, staff expressed the view that the exemption would not pose an unreasonable risk to the environment or the health and safety of persons, pose an unreasonable risk to national security, or result in a failure to achieve conformity with measures of control and international obligations to which Canada has agreed. Staff also advised that there is no trigger for an environmental assessment under subsection 124(1) of the *Mackenzie Valley Resources Management Act* (MVRMA).

52. The Commission considered the staff's recommendation and, pursuant to section 7 of the *Nuclear Safety and Control Act*, decided to exempt the Indore Idle Mine site from licensing for the possession, storage and management of nuclear substances. The exemption is in effect until December 31, 2007, effective November 17, 2004 (see Annex B).

DECISION

Various Identified Idle Mine Sites Without Tailings

53. With respect to various idle mines without uranium tailings in Canada (as listed in Appendix A of CMD 04-M47), staff concluded that, from the information published by Saskatchewan Environment and gathered during site investigations, there are no significant radiological risks associated with these sites and, therefore, no requirement for regulatory control under the NSCA. Referring to section 11 of the *General Nuclear Safety and Control Regulations*, staff expressed the view that the exemptions would not pose an unreasonable risk to the environment or the health and safety of persons, pose an unreasonable risk to national security, or result in a failure to achieve conformity with measures of control and international obligations to which Canada has agreed. Staff also advised that the proposed exemption do not trigger the need for environmental assessments under either the CEAA or MVRMA.
54. The Commission considered the staff's recommendation and, pursuant to section 7 of the *Nuclear Safety and Control Act*, decided to exempt from licensing for the possession, management and storage of nuclear substances the idle mines without uranium

tailings administered under provincial or federal mining or lands management legislation, as identified in Appendix A of CMD 04-M47. The exemptions are for an indefinite period, effective November 17, 2004 (see Annex B).

DECISION

55. The Commission notes that it has the authority to require the licensing of any of these mines, should any change occur which would warrant a licence.

Follow-up on Corrective Actions Taken by OPG in Response to the CNSC Focused Inspection Team Report on Pickering NGS-B Station's Response to the August 14, 2003 Blackout

56. With reference to CMD 04-M48, CMD 04-M48.1 and CMD 04-M48.1A, OPG and staff provided summaries of corrective actions taken by OPG in response to the CNSC's report on Pickering NGS-B station's response to the August 14, 2003 blackout.
57. In response to a question from the Commission on whether OPG's responses reflect an appropriate management safety culture, staff stated that the major deficiencies were resolved quickly with a well-managed process that, in staff's opinion, reflect an acceptable management safety culture.
58. The Commission requested staff to report on the status of the three outstanding issues, in the form of a Significant Development Report at the April 2005 hearing.

ACTION

Closure of the Public Meeting

The public portion of the meeting closed at 4:30 p.m. and the Commission moved in-camera to deliberate on the decisions.

Chair

Recording Secretary

Secretary

ANNEX A

CMD	DATE	File No
04-M40	2004-10-15	(1-3-1-5)
Notice of meeting held on Wednesday, November 17, 2004 in Ottawa		
04-M41	2004-11-03	(1-3-1-5)
Agenda of the meeting of the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission (CNSC) held in the public hearing room, 14th floor, 280 Slater Street, Ottawa, Ontario, on Wednesday, November 17, 2004		
04-M41.A	2004-11-10	(1-3-1-5)
Updated agenda of the meeting of the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission (CNSC) held in the public hearing room, 14th floor, 280 Slater Street, Ottawa, Ontario, on Wednesday, November 17, 2004 – Supplementary Information		
04-M42	2004-11-02	(1-3-1-5)
Approval of minutes of Commission meeting held September 17, 2004		
04-M43	2004-11-02	(1-3-1-5)
Significant Development Report no. 2004-6 for the period of August 26, 2004 to November 1 st , 2004		
04-M44	2004-11-02	(1-3-1-5)
Status report on power reactors for the period of August 30, 2004 to October 29, 2004		
04-M45	2004-11-02	(37-2-2-0)
Mid-term licensing report on Ontario Power Generation Inc.'s Class 1B nuclear facility, the Western Waste Management Facility, under CNSC Waste Facility Operating Licence		
04-M46	2004-11-02	(37-16-8-0/ 37-16-8-1/ 37-16-8-2/ 37-16-8-3/ 37-16-8-4)
Status report on site conditions and progress on the licensing process of waste management areas owned by the Crown, historic contaminated lands, landfills and radium-luminescent devices		
04-M47	2004-11-02	(37-20-5-0/ 37-20-13-0/ 37-20-4-0/ 37-25-0-0)
Status report on site conditions and progress of the licensing process for unlicensed uranium tailings management sites with CNSC staff's recommendations		
04-M48	2004-11-02	(26-1-8-0-0)
Ontario Power Generation Inc.: Follow-up on corrective actions taken by the licensee in response to the CNSC focused inspection team report on Pickering NGS-B station's response to the August 14, 2003 blackout		

04-M48.1 2004-10-28 (1-3-1-7)

Ontario Power Generation Inc.: Follow-up on corrective actions taken by the licensee in response to the CNSC focused inspection team report on Pickering NGS-B station's response to the August 14, 2003 blackout – Oral presentation by Ontario Power Generation Inc.

ANNEX B

Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission November 17, 2004 – Meeting Decisions

Agenda item 5.1 **Landfill Sites Operated Under Federal, Provincial, or Territorial Authority**
reference: CMD 04-M46

Pursuant to section 7 of the *Nuclear Safety and Control Act*, the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission exempts landfill sites operated under federal, provincial, or territorial authority from licensing for the possession, management and storage of nuclear substances that have been, or may be released from CNSC-licensed facilities and activities. The exemption is for an indefinite period beginning on January 1, 2005.

Agenda item 5.1 **Devices Containing Radium Luminous Compounds**
reference: CMD 04-M46

Pursuant to section 7 of the *Nuclear Safety and Control Act*, the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission extends the exemption of devices containing radium luminous compounds from licensing as specified in subsection 8(b) of the Nuclear Substances and Radiation Devices Regulations. The exemption is extended until December 31, 2005.

Agenda item 5.2 **Lorado Idle Mine Site**
reference: CMD 04-M47

Pursuant to section 7 of the *Nuclear Safety and Control Act*, the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission extends the exemption from licensing for the possession, storage and management of nuclear substances at the Lorado Idle Mine Site in Saskatchewan. The exemption is extended until December 31, 2009.

Agenda item 5.2 **Bicroft Tailings Management Site**
reference: CMD 04-M47

Pursuant to section 7 of the *Nuclear Safety and Control Act*, the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission extends the exemption from licensing for the possession, storage and management of nuclear substances at the Bicroft Tailings Management Site in Ontario. The exemption is extended until December 31, 2005.

Agenda item 5.2 **Gunnar Idle Mine Site**
reference: CMD 04-M47

Pursuant to section 7 of the *Nuclear Safety and Control Act*, the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission extends the exemption from licensing for the possession, storage and management of nuclear substances at the Gunnar Idle Mine Site in Saskatchewan. The exemption is extended until December 31, 2009.

Agenda item 5.2 **Indore Idle Mine Site**
reference: CMD 04-M47

Pursuant to section 7 of the *Nuclear Safety and Control Act*, the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission exempts from licensing for the possession, storage and management of nuclear substances at the Indore Idle Mine Site in the Northwest Territories. The exemption is effective starting November 17, 2004, until December 31, 2007.

Agenda item 5.2 **Idle Uranium Mine Sites Without Tailings**
reference: CMD 04-M47

Pursuant to section 7 of the *Nuclear Safety and Control Act*, the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission exempts from licensing for the possession, storage and management of nuclear substances at the idle uranium mine sites identified in Appendix A of CMD 04-M47. The exemptions are for an indefinite period effective November 17, 2004.