Minutes of the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission (CNSC) Meeting held Wednesday and Thursday, June 8 and 9, 2011, beginning at 4:06 p.m. on June 8 in the Public Hearing Room, 14th floor, 280 Slater Street, Ottawa, Ontario.

Present:

M. Binder, President
A. Harvey
R.J. Barriault
D.D. Tolgyesi (June 8)
M. J. McDill

M. Leblanc, Secretary
J. Lavoie, Senior General Counsel / L. Thiele, Senior Counsel
S. Gingras, Recording Secretary


Other contributors were:
- Hydro-Québec: P. Desbiens
- Ontario Power Generation: M. Elliot, T. Henderson and D. McCool
- Transport Canada: C. Law and J. Tomaselli
- SRB Technologies (Canada) Inc.: S. Levesque

Constitution

1. With the notice of meeting, CMD 11-M26, having been properly given and a quorum of Commission Members being present, the meeting was declared to be properly constituted.

2. Since the meeting of the Commission held March 30 and 31, 2011, Commission Member Documents CMD 11-M26 to CMD 11-M40 were distributed to Members. These documents are further detailed in Annex A of these minutes.

Adoption of the Agenda

3. The revised agenda, CMD 11-M27.B, was adopted as presented.
Chair and Secretary

4. The President chaired the meeting of the Commission, assisted by M. Leblanc, Secretary and S. Gingras, Recording Secretary.

Minutes of the CNSC Meeting Held March 30 and 31, 2011

5. The Commission Members approved the minutes of the March 30 and 31, 2011 Commission Meeting as presented in CMD 11-M28.

Status Report on Power Reactors

6. With reference to CMD 11-M30, which includes the Status Report on Power Reactors, CNSC staff presented updates on the following:

- Bruce A refurbishment: CNSC staff provided comprehensive information on the status of the Bruce A refurbishment. In particular, the moderator is refuelled and 900 feeders were installed in Unit 2, and feeder installation has started in Unit 1.
- Bruce B: Unit 7 is in plant maintenance outage. The outage is eight days behind schedule due to the discovery of degradation of the boiler primary side divider plate locking tabs. The unit is scheduled to come back online on June 12 or 13, 2011.
- Pickering A: for Unit 1, a repeat outage for isolation valve repairs is complete but the system is not yet returned to service due to newly discovered equipment issues. The fuelling machine repairs are not yet complete. Unit 4 is operating at low power critical, the replacement of its turbine intercept valve is in progress. Pending successful replacement, OPG expects this Unit to be returned to service by June 13 or sooner.
- Pickering B: Unit 5 was returning from a plant outage which ended on May 12, 2011, but the approach to critical did not occur as predicted because of a moderator poison issue. This topic is discussed later in the Minutes of Meeting.
- Point Lepreau refurbishment: the calandria tube installation is currently on hold for the planned cleaning of the calandria. The planned completion date for the calandria tube installation is August 2011 and not June 2011 as stated in CMD 11-M30.
- CNSC staff also provided an update on the implications for Canada of the events in Japan, including the status of the requests by the CNSC under subsection 12(2) of the General Nuclear Safety and Control Regulations to Class I licensees,

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1 CNSC staff confirmed after the Meeting that the Bruce B Unit 7 came back on line on June 21, 2011.
2 CNSC staff confirmed after the Meeting that a number of turbine expansion joints were also being replaced.
3 CNSC staff confirmed after the Meeting that Pickering A Unit 4 was at 96% of full power on July 18, 2011 and was expected to be at full power on July 20, 2011.
requesting them to review the initial lessons learned from the Fukushima events, re-examine the safety cases and report on implementation plans for short-term and long-term measures to address any significant gaps.

7. The Commission asked for more information on the pressure boundary failure incident at Pickering A Unit 4 as described in CMD 11-M30. CNSC staff confirmed the failure in the turbine system and reported that OPG is still investigating the causes of the event. CNSC staff noted that one of the potential causes of the event was that the system was not installed as per design. The OPG representative confirmed the accuracy of CNSC staff’s description and noted that an expansion joint ruptured, downstream of a release valve that failed into the open position. The OPG representative added that this valve is under investigation as they believe that it failed. No further update to the Commission is planned as this incident is considered minor.

STATUS REPORTS

Event Notification Report (ENR)

8. With reference to CMD 11-M37, CNSC staff presented information regarding the Pickering B Nuclear Generating Station (NGS) Unit 5 moderator poison that was lower than expected.

9. The Commission asked for more information on the origin of the oil contamination. The OPG representative explained that results from the investigation led the conclusion that, in 2006, a moderator compressor had a diaphragm leak which added approximately 10 to 15 litres of oil into the moderator cover gas, which subsequently went into the head tank.

10. The Commission asked for anticipated solutions to this problem. The OPG representative responded that one possible solution would be to burn off the poison when the reactor is at low power. CNSC staff confirmed that they had received the safety case for this potential solution and that they were reviewing it.

11. The Commission asked for the potential effect of the deposited gadolinium. The OPG representative explained that this situation can lead to an uneven power distribution inside the core, which may lead to further monitoring to control possible flux tilts.

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4 The Commission has since issued a letter to OPG allowing it to temporarily deviate from licence condition 3.1 of its operating licence in order to use an alternate shutdown state to solve the problem.
INFORMATION ITEM

Technical Briefing from CNSC Staff: Ascertaining Dose as Part of a Radiation Protection Program: Dosimetry Techniques, Practices and Applications

12. With reference to CMD 11-M29, CNSC staff presented a summary of dosimetry techniques and related radiation protection practices. The following elements have been presented: basic concepts of dosimetry, external and internal dosimetry techniques, and the licensing of dosimetry techniques by the CNSC.

13. The Commission asked for comments on the accuracy of radiation measurements using dosimeters. CNSC staff responded that the theoretical accuracies are between 30% under and 50% over the measured value since they are reflective of all sources of uncertainty. However, CNSC staff noted that the licensees can better estimate a dose because most of the important information is known (the types of radionuclides involved, for example).

14. The Commission expressed its satisfaction about CNSC staff’s efforts to provide technical information on dosimetry and radiation protection. CNSC staff noted that these documents are intended to link to each other to provide meaningful information to the public.

15. The Commission asked whether the accuracy in measurement would differ with dose. CNSC staff confirmed that the accuracy would be worse at very low doses. CNSC staff also stated that the determination of whether a worker exceeded a regulatory dose would take into account the accuracy of measurement.

16. The Commission asked for more information on compliance verification regarding the accuracy of measurement. CNSC staff explained that compliance verification of licensees include a verification of the implementation of the dosimetry program, as well as a verification of the radiation protection program (which includes radiation measurement techniques). CNSC staff added that they have a memorandum of understanding with Health Canada which have the capability to verify the performance of the licensees regarding dosimetry. CNSC staff also noted that dosimetry licences include a requirement to have Health Canada independently verify instruments and performance. The National Research Council and an American laboratory are also involved in the verification of dosimetry performance.

17. The Commission asked for more information on testing done on whole body counters. CNSC staff responded that annual testing is done by Health Canada on these instruments, and the measurements results are consolidated in an annual report. Measurement comparisons between laboratories are also done to verify their accuracy.
18. The Commission asked for reasons why the effective dose to a worker is one order of magnitude lower than the equivalent dose to the skin, and the difference between equivalent dose and effective dose. CNSC staff explained that equivalent dose is used to prevent damage to an organ (most often the skin) from radiation exposure, while effective dose is used to determine the risk of cancer for the whole body.

19. The Commission enquired about actions taken by CNSC staff to ensure that all licensees expecting doses higher than 5 mSv use a licensed dosimetry service. CNSC staff responded that licensees submit doses to workers through their annual reports. These doses are verified and, if the total dose for a worker exceeds 5 mSv or any type of dose (alpha, beta, gamma, neutron) exceeds 1 mSv, the licensee is required to use a licensed dosimetry service.

20. The Commission asked, in light of the Japan events, if there would be enough radiation detectors available for nuclear energy workers in the case of a nuclear disaster in Canada. CNSC staff responded that they did not have the information readily available but that they would provide it at a later date.

21. The Commission asked for more details on a newspaper article stating that radiation doses to some workers compiled in the National Dose Registry were above regulatory limits. CNSC staff explained that, on the four records in question, three were later corrected. CNSC staff is searching for more information on the fourth record, but suspects that this record is non-personal but was not corrected since the person changed occupation.

22. As a response to the Commission’s question on the methods for CNSC staff to be informed of a dose exceeding regulatory limits, CNSC staff explained that the National Dose Registry informs both the CNSC and the applicable provincial or territorial authority when a dose record exceeds a regulatory limit. There is also a requirement in the Nuclear Safety and Control Act for a licensee to report to the CNSC any radiation dose exceeding regulatory limits.

23. The Commission commented that information about uncertainties should be included in CNSC staff’s report. CNSC staff answered that this comment would be taken into account when the CMD is written as an information document and published on the CNSC web site.

24. The Commission asked CNSC staff for a timeline for converting CNSC staff’s CMD into an information document and publish this document on the CNSC’s web site. CNSC staff responded that this document should be published by October 2011.
DECISION ITEMS


25. With reference to CMD 11-M38, CNSC staff presented to the Commission its recommendation for the publication of RD/GD-369.

26. The Commission asked how changes could be incorporated in the document, if necessary. CNSC staff responded that, while they consider this document appropriate at the current time, there is built-in flexibility and understanding that, over time, changes will be needed and be incorporated as appropriate.

27. The Commission enquired on the stakeholders reactions to CNSC staff’s decision not to reduce the amount of details in the design. CNSC staff answered that very little reaction was noted and that some stakeholders have acknowledged that detailed information on design might be appropriate in view of the new build projects and to enhance the likelihood of a project being successful. CNSC staff explained that if an applicant follows the regulatory requirements set out in the available regulatory documents, the risk of a project not being acceptable is low.

28. The Commission asked how criteria for water cooling systems would be included during a process for building a new nuclear power plant. CNSC staff responded that the design of cooling technology is discussed at the environmental assessment stage, and requirements resulting from that environmental assessment are embedded into the licence.

29. The Commission asked for a typical time frame for the review of a construction licence application once the required environmental assessment process is completed. CNSC staff answered that they are currently planning to review a licence application within a 24-month period, followed by a two-day public hearing process. CNSC staff confirmed that they are planning on working with the licensees to ensure that relevant programs are in place once a licence to prepare a site is issued. CNSC staff added that a vendor can also request a pre-project design review, where CNSC staff can review a project design and provide feedback on possible barriers to licensing.

30. In response to a question from the Commission on the possible combination of a construction and operating licence, CNSC staff explained that, while an applicant could request a construction licence and an operating licence in two separate hearings, both applications could also be considered in a single hearing. The
licences could then include hold points in order to control the necessary steps in the project and ensure the requisite information for both licences is available.

31. The Commission asked about monitoring activities during construction. CNSC staff responded that, under the lifecycle project, the development of a compliance program is planned which provides for a risk-informed approach regarding the inspection of key construction activities.

32. The Commission asked for comments on the more prescriptive approach used in the United States compared to the Canadian model. CNSC staff confirmed that their approach is similar to the American approach, but that it is simplified and less prescriptive. CNSC staff added that their less prescriptive approach requires the applicants to outline their proposed actions to demonstrate that the plant is constructed as designed.

33. The Commission asked how the IAEA Safety Guide GS-G-4.1, *Format and Content of the Safety Analysis Report for Nuclear Power Plants*, has been adapted to the Canadian context. CNSC staff responded that they ensured that all CNSC regulatory documents and some CSA documents were appropriately referenced in RD/GD 369. CNSC staff added that information on the construction program also had to be added to RD/GD-369, as the approach to commissioning is different in Canada. A firmer emphasis on the management system, safety culture and knowledge skills and abilities of workers was also added.


**DECISION**

*Regulations Amending the Packaging and Transport of Nuclear Substance Regulations*

35. The Commission, composed of its three Members, approves the necessary amendments to the *Packaging and Transport of Nuclear Substance Regulations* as proposed by CNSC staff in a closed session.

**DECISION**
Updates on items from previous Commission proceedings

Cameco Corporation (Cameco): Update on the shipment of uranium concentrate on board the vessel MCP Altona

36. With reference to CMD 11-M35, CNSC staff presented an update on the incident at sea involving a shipment of uranium concentrate on board the marine vessel MCP Altona in Vancouver. CNSC staff noted that three drums were breached and not two as was stated in CMD 11-M35. CNSC staff provided information in the form of an early notification report at the January 19, 2011 Commission Meeting and followed up with a verbal update at the March 31, 2011 Commission Meeting.

37. CNSC staff offered to come back at a Commission Meeting in the fall of 2011 to present the results of the event reconstruction that will be used to determine the causes of the event. CNSC staff expects the report to help them in identifying possible new regulatory requirements. The Commission notes that it is satisfied with the information to date and will only require a follow-up report if there are new safety-related findings.

38. The Commission asked why there was water monitoring around the Altona. CNSC staff responded that Cameco included water monitoring in their action plan to ensure that the immediate vicinity of the ship was not contaminated. In response to further questioning from the Commission on why the monitoring frequency was weekly and not daily, the Cameco representative explained that their action plan was prepared by third-party experts and reviewed by CNSC staff, Environment Canada and the British Columbia Environment Department who all determined that the weekly frequency was acceptable.

39. The Commission enquired on follow-up on radiation exposure for the worker from Blind River. The Cameco representative confirmed that the Blind River facility has its own radiation monitoring program and, therefore, this worker would have received appropriate care and estimation of radiation dose received in relation to this incident.

40. In response to a question from the Commission on the recovery of water used for pressure washing, CNSC staff confirmed that this water was recovered and sent to the Key Lake facility.

41. The Commission asked for any changes in the shipment process after this incident. The Cameco representative responded that methods to lash the containers inside the ship had changed, in accordance with the safety notice information that was provided by CNSC staff and recommendations from the ship captain.
42. In response to a question from the Commission on the shipment of uranium to China, the Cameco representative confirmed that a replacement shipment was sent out in May 2011, as the material involved in the incident was being remediated.

43. The Commission asked Transport Canada if an investigation would have occurred if there were no dangerous goods involved, as well as for a date for the submission of the final investigation report. The Transport Canada representative responded that they did not have the information available, but that they would provide it to the Commission at a later date.

Mid-Term Status Reports

Cameco Corporation: *Mid-Term Report on the Safety Performance of the Key Lake Operation*

44. With reference to CMD 11-M32 and CMD 11-M32.1, Cameco and CNSC staff presented a mid-term report on the performance of the Key Lake Operation.

45. The Commission asked if the action levels and administrative levels for molybdenum concentrations would eventually be lowered, the measured concentrations being significantly lower than those limits. CNSC staff responded that they could, considering that these action levels are related to performance and the type of facility and that they should be reviewed regularly to ensure that they fill their role of early indicators of possible loss of control.

46. The Commission asked for information on regulatory limits for uranium, molybdenum and selenium in effluents. CNSC staff confirmed that no regulations currently exist for these contaminants in effluents, but that CNSC staff was working on implementing such limits. The Commission asked CNSC staff to implement these limits by the time the Key Lake operating licence expires in 2013.

47. The Commission asked for information on the use of the air ambulance. The Cameco representative explained that an air ambulance is available to bring injured employees to Prince Albert in approximately one hour (the air ambulance being posted in Prince Albert). The Cameco representative added that occupational health and safety nursing personnel is also available on site.

48. The Commission enquired on the High Five Program. The Cameco representative explained that this program originated from a radiation coordinator at Key Lake Operation, and consists of determining which five workers registered the highest radiation
doses and determining which actions could be taken to lower these
doses. The program would also be applicable to contractors. The
Cameco representative added that it is early to determine if this
program has been useful since it was only started in 2010. CNSC
staff commented that similar programs are implemented at other
facilities and that CNSC staff expects licensees to focus on
activities that generate the highest exposure to workers.

49. In response to questions from the Commission on sulphur dioxide
emission reductions, CNSC staff explained that SO₂ is a concern
because of its impact on vegetation from acid rain, but that
environmental monitoring is performed and no impacts on
vegetation or changes in pH in water have been noticed in the Key
Lake area.

50. The Commission asked if there have been problems with
occupational asthma and reactive airway disease related to SO₂
exposure. The Cameco representative stated that they found no link
between the exposure to SO₂ and these diseases, but that there was
some exposure to this gas that forced them to modify their start-up
procedures. At the suggestion of the Commission, the Cameco
representative noted that they would do further testing to determine
if some workers are affected by reactive airway diseases that can
cause occupational asthma.

51. The Cameco representative noted that Key Lake Operation has not
been affected by fires in northern Saskatchewan, and that Cameco
and the Province of Saskatchewan have excellent fire protection
measures in place.

Cameco Corporation: *Mid-Term Report on the Safety Performance of the
McArthur River Operation*

52. With reference to CMD 11-M33.1 and CMD 11-M33, Cameco and
CNSC staff presented a mid-term report on the performance of the
McArthur River Operation.

53. The Commission asked for information on testing of employees for
possible substance abuse. The Cameco representative responded
that a drug and alcohol policy is in place and that monitoring is
performed according to that policy. No random testing is done, but
pre-employment testing for substance abuse is in place.

54. The Commission asked when the target values for molybdenum for
the McArthur River facility would become action or administrative
levels. CNSC staff responded that they think that the 2013 licence
renewal activities would provide a reasonable time for setting those
limits. The Cameco representative explained that, in order to
establish action or administrative levels, normal and consistent
operating activities need to be established and, therefore, more
operating experience is required.
55. The Commission enquired on the origin of the 1 mg/L target for molybdenum concentration. CNSC staff explained that this target was thought as a reasonable objective with the currently available technologies, and had no link with any Saskatchewan surface water quality objectives.

56. In response to questioning from the Commission on actions taken relating to an individual having received a radiation dose approximately half of the five-year dose limit of 100 mSv, the Cameco representative explained that, similar to Key Lake, a program is in place to examine people having received the highest doses, as well as the highest risk areas, and take action if necessary. A tool has also been developed that allows Cameco to predict doses to an individual instead of waiting for dosimetry results. CNSC staff commented that they consider Cameco to take adequate measures in this area.

57. The Commission asked for more information on testing done to the steel on the slurry tote containers. The Cameco representative explained that destructive testing of the slurry totes occurs at a regular frequency to ensure that they are performing to the 2011 designed expectations, and that more testing is done than what was reported in CMD 11-M33. Cameco committed to provide to the Commission the third-party report on the testing done on their slurry totes.

58. The Commission asked for reasons why strong increases in ventilation are occasionally required. The Cameco representative explained that strong increases in ventilation are related to the amount of activity in the mine: the transition into new mining areas opens up more areas that need to be ventilated. CNSC staff confirmed that they review and approve changes to the ventilation system.

59. In response to more information requested by the Commission on the seemingly high number of spills in the recent years (10 from November 2008 to December 2010), CNSC staff explained that the number of spills is one criteria used, in addition to their severity and the causes of the incidents, in determining a possible loss of control by the licensee. The Cameco representative commented that these incidents are taken seriously, and that action was taken to reduce or prevent recurrence.

Cameco Corporation: *Mid-Term Report on the Safety Performance of the Rabbit Lake Operation*

60. With reference to CMD 11-M34.1 and CMD 11-M34, Cameco and CNSC staff presented a mid-term report on the performance of the Rabbit Lake Operation.
61. The Commission asked for more information on radiation exposures linked to ventilation that occurred in 2009 and 2010 and whether these events were related to training deficiencies and rapid contractor turnover. The Cameco representative explained that the two events involved two different contract employees and, while they were both ventilation related, they were different events. The Cameco representative added that there are specific training requirements for all employees or contractors on site, and that a database keeps track of possible deficiencies in training that will be remediated.

62. The Commission enquired on the number of women working at the mine sites. The Cameco representative responded that approximately 50 women, including aboriginal women, work at Rabbit Lake.

63. The Commission expressed its satisfaction with the reconnecting of the A Zone coffer dam to Wollaston Lake, which is a fishing lake, and asked about the verifications that were made regarding contamination before its opening. The Cameco representative explained that, before the planned opening of the A Zone coffer dam, the mined out A Zone pit had been studied for a number of years to ensure its stability.

64. In response to questioning from the Commission on the reclamation of Link Lakes, the Cameco representative explained that Link Lakes were historically impacted through some of the original mining that was completed at Rabbit Lake approximately 35 years ago. The Cameco representative added that studies have included excavating some of the contaminated sediments. Physical access work is now being considered in the context of the long-term reclamation planning for Link Lakes. CNSC staff concurred with Cameco, and noted that they were expecting Cameco to provide a plan for the activities related to Link Lakes by the end of the year 2011.

SRB Technologies (Canada) Inc.: Annual Status Report on the Safety Performance of the Facility

65. With reference to CMD 11-M36.1 and CMD 11-M36, SRB Technologies (Canada) Inc. (SRB) and CNSC staff presented an annual status report on the safety performance of this facility.

66. The Commission asked for reasons for the late payment of the cost recovery fee that was due for June 1, 2011. The SRB representative responded that an administrative error from one of their clients resulted in delays in payment from this important client, and therefore made it impossible for SRB to make the June 1st payment
to the CNSC. The SRB representative pointed out that most of the payments (decommissioning fund, cost recovery arrears, and ongoing cost recovery fees) were made on time since August 2008. SRB stated that they expect being able to make this payment by the end of June 2011\(^5\).

67. The Commission enquired on tritium values from the well SRB MW06-10. CNSC staff explained that, because of its proximity to the SRB building, the values measured from that well are variable; therefore, measurements need to be taken for a long period of time before a trend is seen. CNSC staff expects the measured tritium values to decrease with time. The SRB representative confirmed that, since 2006, the average annual values for tritium in that well decreased.

68. The Commission asked for a comparison of tritium concentration values in wine produced in, and in sludge generated by, municipalities between the SRB surrounding area and elsewhere in Ontario. CNSC staff responded that they did not have the information readily available, but that they would research it and include the information into the next annual status report on SRB in June 2012.

69. The Commission enquired on the relationship of SRB with the public. The SRB representative responded that, since licence renewal, all information relevant to the facility was put on the SRB website. The SRB representative added that only one request for information was received, and it was to receive a copy of the annual report for that facility. CNSC staff commented that, in the past, the public had a fair amount of interest and concerns were expressed to CNSC staff outside of Commission hearings of meetings. CNSC staff added that they verify if the information on the facility, for example the licence and licence conditions handbook and monitoring data, is on the SRB website. The public interest in this facility seems to have diminished.

70. The Commission asked how the measured tritium level values at well RW-1 compared to the mathematical models used. CNSC staff explained that the model used was slightly more conservative than the measured values and, therefore, the licensee performed better than predicted.

71. In response to a question from the Commission on the tritium values near the river, CNSC staff explained that they do not expect any surprises at the river, the measured values having always been very low and are expected to remain so. CNSC staff noted that the model does not predict the migration of a plume away from the facility, but predicts tritium migrating from the surface of the ground to the water sampling locations.

\(^5\) CNSC staff confirmed after the Meeting that this payment was made by the end of June 2011.
72. The Commission asked SRB what were the expectations for the future of the company. The SRB representative responded that they expect to continue to decrease tritium emissions, and that the committees currently in place at SRB keep looking at finding ways to reduce emissions.

73. The Commission asked for details on the actions implemented to reduce emissions. The SRB representative answered that the main actions taken include the constant use of new containers for depleted uranium, the removal of oil pumps from the facility and not operating during periods of precipitation.

74. At the request of the Commission, CNSC staff confirmed that they verified the tritium concentration values provided by SRB and that they are satisfied with this information.

75. The Commission asked for more information on the recovery of used products. The SRB representative responded that they try to find other uses for the returned product that would fit its brightness level and, if that is not possible, they dispose of the product in a CNSC licensed waste facility.

Regulatory Framework Annual Update

76. With reference to CMD 11-M39, CNSC staff presented an update on the accomplishments with the regulatory framework program for the past year.

77. The Commission asked for the motivation behind producing these regulatory documents. CNSC staff explained the objective of the regulatory framework to ensure that the following three questions can be answered with a yes: (1) are there documents in place that ensure clarity of what licensees or applicants need to submit in order to obtain a licence?; (2) is there enough clarity on the requirements for each of the safety and control areas?; and (3) is there enough clarity on what is required to meet compliance reporting requirements?.

78. The Commission asked for information on the review of the documents. CNSC staff explained that the older documents have been recently reviewed and some withdrawn, and that a good practice is to revisit all documents in a five-year cycle.

79. The Commission asked for an update on the status of the three-year plan. CNSC staff responded that they are in the final stages of publishing this plan. The Commission requests a copy of this plan when available.

ACTION

by

December 2011
Closure of the Public Meeting

80. The meeting closed at 3:35 p.m.

[Signatures and dates]
APPENDIX A

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>CMD</th>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>File No</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tr>
<td>11-M26</td>
<td>2011-05-06</td>
<td>(Edocs 3719904)</td>
<td>Notice of Meeting of June 8 and 9, 2011</td>
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<td>11-M27</td>
<td>2011-05-25</td>
<td>(Edocs 3728523)</td>
<td>Agenda of the meeting of the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission to be held on Wednesday and Thursday, June 8 and 9, 2011, in the Public Hearing Room, 14th floor, 280 Slater Street, Ottawa, Ontario.</td>
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<td>11-M27.A</td>
<td>2011-06-02</td>
<td>(Edocs 3732328)</td>
<td>Updated agenda of the meeting of the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission to be held on Wednesday and Thursday, June 8 and 9, 2011, in the Public Hearing Room, 14th floor, 280 Slater Street, Ottawa, Ontario.</td>
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<td>(Edocs 3733623)</td>
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<td>(Edocs 3734349)</td>
<td>Approval of Minutes of Commission Meeting held on March 30 and 31, 2011</td>
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<td>11-M30</td>
<td>2011-05-17</td>
<td>(Edocs 3725343)</td>
<td>Status Report on Power Reactors</td>
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<td>11-M37</td>
<td>2011-05-02</td>
<td>(Edocs 3720106)</td>
<td>Ontario Power Generation Inc.: Pickering B Nuclear Generating Station – Unit 5 Moderator Poison (Gadolinium) concentration lower than expected (P-2011-07285)</td>
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<td>11-M29</td>
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<td>(Edocs 3725343)</td>
<td>Technical Briefing from CNSC Staff – Oral presentation by CNSC staff</td>
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<td>11-M31</td>
<td>2011-05-24</td>
<td>(Edocs 3729537)</td>
<td>Information regarding Regulatory Document RD-363 – Contains prescribed security information and is not publicly available</td>
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<td>11-M40</td>
<td>2011-05-31</td>
<td>(Edocs 3686992)</td>
<td>Regulations Amending the Packaging and Transport of Nuclear Substances Regulations – Contains prescribed security information and is not publicly available</td>
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<td>Cameco Corporation: Update on the shipment of uranium concentrate on board the vessel MCP Altona – Oral presentation by CNSC staff</td>
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<td>11-M32.1A</td>
<td>2011-06-01</td>
<td>Cameco Corporation: Mid-term Report on the Safety Performance of the Key Lake Operation – Oral presentation by Cameco Corporation – Supplementary Information</td>
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SRB Technologies (Canada) Inc.: Annual Status Report on the safety performance of the facility – Oral presentation by CNSC staff

Regulatory Framework Annual Update – Oral presentation by CNSC staff