

please?

Dr. Edwards, are you still there?

DR. EDWARDS: Yes, I'm here.

MEMBER BERUBE: Okay.

THE PRESIDENT: Go ahead, Staff.

MR. ELDER: Peter Elder, for the record.

I'm the Vice-President of Technical Support and the Chief Science Officer.

We did touch on this a little bit earlier in the hearings. So the dump tank as the second system is adequate for slow events. Dr. Edwards is correct, that what was the intent of having two independent shutdown systems was to make sure that you had very high confidence of shutdown for fast events.

In the mid-1990s the AECB, at the time, ordered OPG to make improvements to the fast system at Pickering A. So there's a substantial improvement to the design to make sure that it had the same functionality as the two shutdown systems, as two independent shutdown systems.

Since then, this has been reviewed a number of times through the periodic safety review and also through the PSAs, and we have achieved the same intent; that is we have very high confidence that the reactors will be shutdown on any situation.

THE PRESIDENT: Thank you. Questions?

DR. EDWARDS: Sorry, should I -- oh, you're asking the Commissioners?

THE PRESIDENT: No, I'm asking the Commission, anybody. Anybody has any other questions?

DR. EDWARDS: I would like to make a comment on that last answer if I could?

THE PRESIDENT: Go ahead please.

DR. EDWARDS: Yes, I mean, I just think it's, on the face of it, absurd that the one fast shutdown system is equivalent to the two fast shutdowns. Why then are you causing the other reactors to have two fast shutdown systems? Why don't you just get them all to use the really good fast shutdown system that Pickering A has?

There's a very good reason for this, and that is you don't take any chances. Fast shutdown systems do fail or not function perfectly. That can lead to total destruction of the core of a reactor. That's why you have two fast shutdown systems. I think, at the very least, the Commission should not allow those oldest reactors to continue operating.

I think given the reluctance of Ontario Power Generation to do a refurbishment, replacing the plumbing of Pickering B, the Commission should require that and say, look, if you want to continue operating it beyond

what was reasonable and what you previously pledged to do, then refurbish them.

THE PRESIDENT: Okay. Let me try to explain what I understand from Staff. Pickering A was first built with one shutdown, Pickering B was -- and the rest were with two. When the instruction was to improve, they put in an alternative means to a fast shutdown, which is the gadolinium and all that stuff.

Is that my understanding?

DR. EDWARDS: No, that's not right.

THE PRESIDENT: The alternative stuff is as good or is functional as having two shutdowns.

Am I understanding correctly?

MR. FRAPPIER: Gerry Frappier, for the record. Not quite. So Pickering A does not have a gadolinium system. We just went through the periodic safety review where we just went through the analysis. Perhaps I could ask Dr. Al Omar to explain exactly where it's centred around the shutdown system for Pickering A?

DR. OMAR: Al Omar, for the record. Again, Pickering A originally has two systems to assist the shutdown of the reactor. One of them was slow -- or judged slow -- which is the dump tank.

Currently in the PSR, the current PSR, the current two shutdown systems have been assessed and

declared qualified for the events that are analyzed. So we have two shutdown systems now for Pickering A. The only difference is that the extended or enhanced shutdown system, we'll call it shutdown system 2, does not have gadolinium injection, but we added absorber rods, but it satisfied the design function, safety and regulatory requirement as shutdown system 2.

THE PRESIDENT: Okay, thank you. Dr. Edwards, anything else you want to ask?

DR. EDWARDS: Well, it's definitely cutting corners, there's no question about it. I mean, it's an old reactor. You would not require the Bruce reactors, the Darlington reactors, the overseas reactors, you wouldn't require them to have two fast shutdown systems if one was enough.

If you solved the problem for Pickering A so that you have a fast shutdown system based on rods that's totally adequate to the two shutdown systems, then why go to the extra expense of having two shutdown systems in every other CANDU reactor?

I think that we're just banding words here. We're not really talking about the fact that you are, to some degree, shaving the margin off the safety margin, and that could be a huge difference in the event of a violent emergency.

If you have, for example, an earthquake situation which somehow interferes with the descent of the rods into the core, as happened at NRX in 1952, the rods just didn't descend into the core properly, and that's why the core of the reactor was totally destroyed.

So I think we're banding words here. My point is that if the CNSC is really dedicated to never compromising safety, then they shouldn't compromise safety.

THE PRESIDENT: Okay. OPG, you were going to say something about that?

MR. LOCKWOOD: Randy Lockwood, for the record. I'm going to ask Steve Gregoris to -- we spoke about this yesterday, that Pickering A does have two shutdown systems: one, drop rods into the core; and, as well, the second was the dump tank drop the moderator, hence you can't maintain criticality.

Sometime ago it was determined that for some events the dump tank wasn't fast enough. Then there was an extensive enhancement to the system that initiates dropping the rods.

I'll let Steve walk through the enhancements. Steve.

MR. GREGORIS: Steve Gregoris, for the record. So, as Mr. Lockwood said, there are two ways to shutdown the Pickering 1 to 4 reactors. Shutoff rods fall

in core or the moderator dumps. The moderator dump is the deepest insertion of reactivity, because you remove the moderator. There is no way that that reactor can go critical. You know, we talked about benefits and maybe some challenges to that system, that system is an effective system. You know, I want to give that appreciation to the Commission.

When this was reviewed in the mid-1990s to early-2000s, when Pickering 1 to 4 was coming towards return to service, there was a lot of discussion, it included the Staff, it included the Commission, Commission presentations.

To improve the shutdown systems on 1 to 4 there was a shutdown system enhancement done. That increased the number of shutoff rods that originally were designed for those reactors. It also included a set of separate parameters to monitor the different parameters that would require a shutdown; those are neutronic parameters and also process parameters.

So effectively, we have, you know, an additional set of parameters monitoring, we have additional shutoff rods, plus the original two systems and the original parameters that are monitored. With all of that, you know, it was proven that that's equivalent to two fast-acting shutdown systems, and it was proven that the

ability to shutdown the reactor or not shut it down was an incredible event.

DR. EDWARDS: Well, incredible, that's an interesting word. All the accidents that have ever happened in the nuclear field have been incredible.

The point of the matter is, and I repeat, nobody since the early days, like around the time of the Royal Commission on Electric Power Planning, it was by that time fully acknowledged that the moderator dump while, yes, shutting down the reactor, is way too slow. You have to shutdown the reactor within two seconds.

Because in a CANDU reactor you have a problem similar to the one at Chernobyl, which is when you lose the coolant, if you have a loss of coolant accident you're going to get a power surge. If you don't terminate that within two seconds, you're going to have a destroyed core. The core of the reactor's going to be totally destroyed. The moderator dump is absolutely incapable of dealing with that.

So these fast shutdown rods are one system, and you can increase the number of them, but they're not -- that doesn't make it independent.

It was decided early on by the Atomic Energy Control Board in order to make sure that we do not compromise safety, in order to ensure that we live up to

that high standard and the trust that the Canadian public has put upon us, we will insist that there be two fully-independent fast shutdown systems, each one of which could totally shutdown the reactor quickly in less than two seconds.

Because if one of those shutdown systems fails, there's still another one that can do it. You don't have that at Pickering A.

THE PRESIDENT: Okay. Staff, last word on that?

MR. FRAPPIER: Gerry Frappier, for the record. I'd ask Mr. Vali Tavasoli to explain the equivalency of the shutdown systems.

DR. EDWARDS: Is Mr. Frappier -- you're with CNSC, right?

MR. FRAPPIER: That's correct, Dr. Edwards.

DR. EDWARDS: I'm surprised that CNSC is defending OPG on this instead of letting OPG defend itself.

THE PRESIDENT: Okay. I'd like to hear about the regulatory oversight here and the inspection that goes with it.

Who's going to talk to this?

MR. FRAPPIER: Vali Tavasoli is in Ottawa, and should be able to talk to that.

THE PRESIDENT: Okay. Go ahead please, Ottawa.

MR. TAVASOLI: This is Vali Tavasoli, Director of Reactor Physics and Fuel Division at CNSC. There's a couple of things that I'd like to mention. One of them was a statement by our own Staff regarding the enhanced shutdown system being a second shutdown system. This is not true.

One other thing I'd like to add is that, as Dr. Elder said, the moderator dump is effective for more probable slower transients. These transients is because of some of the component failures that Dr. Edwards has brought up himself, like steam generator failure, pressure tube failure, feeder failure.

These are slower transients and for these types of transients which are very probable -- not very probable, more probable than other faster transients, the moderator dump is fully effective.

With respect to the fact that the moderator dump might not be fully effective for faster transients, there might be a residual risk. This residual risk has been taken into account in the PSA studies.

The statement that Mr. Jammal made in the first night about the equivalency of that was based on a risk-informed assessment that the CNSC had done many years

ago. That risk-informed result was that, yes, that on a risk-informed basis the two systems could be considered equivalent.

THE PRESIDENT: Okay. Dr. Edwards, any final thoughts you want to share with us?

DR. EDWARDS: Well, my final thought is that in my 40 years of intervening at CNSC hearings I have found it difficult to understand why the licensee and the CNSC Staff always seem to be saying the same things and supporting each other.

I would expect that in a proper regulatory agency that the Staff of the regulator would be asking tough questions all the time of the licensee, holding the licensee's feet to the fire and insisting that they get adequate answers in the interest of public safety, rather than simply echoing what the licensee is putting forward.

I do ask the Commissioners to consider the fact that we do not have the opportunity to engage in cross-examination. I cross-examined nuclear experts for a period of three months during the Royal Commission on Electric Power Planning, and was able to make a lot of headway, and the Commission came out with a report which sided against many of the claims that were being made by the industry.

In these hearings, these regulatory

hearings, licensing hearings, there's no such opportunity. As a result, you have both the regulator and the licensee coming in with the same story, asking for the same thing of the Commissioners, and the only opposition you really get or the only tough questions you get are from intervenors who are like gadflies, because they only get 10 minutes and then a short period of question and answer.

I believe that there are serious questions here that the Commissioners should examine their conscience about and say, do I really want to give a licence to a plant which is not really up to snuff even by the current practice that is acknowledged for all other CANDU reactors?

THE PRESIDENT: Okay, thank you. Thank you for your intervention.

DR. EDWARDS: Thank you.

THE PRESIDENT: We will now break for dinner. We'll resume at 6:30.

MR. LEBLANC: The reason it is 6:30 is because some intervenors have been told that it would be after 6:30, so we just don't know if they'll be here prior to that.

--- Upon recessing at 5:07 p.m. /

Suspension à 17 h 07

--- Upon resuming at 6:31 p.m. /

Reprise à 18 h 31

THE PRESIDENT: Okay. We are back and ready to proceed with the next presentation, which is by Mr. Ayazi, as outlined in CMD 18-H6.68. Go ahead, please.

CMD 18-H6.68

Oral presentation by Mr. Amir Ayazi

MR. AYAZI: Thank you.

So my name is Amir Ayazi. I am born and raised in Toronto in the GTA. I have lived in the East end for a large percentage of that time, over a decade, and I also attended the University of Toronto Scarborough campus, so I have lived very close to the Pickering plant for a long time.

Now, I have always known about the Pickering power plant because a friend that I grew up within Scarborough moved to Pickering -- his name is Joel Bowan (phonetic) -- and we would always make jokes, like Simpsons-style jokes. He lives right next to the power plant, three-eyed fish and whatnot. So one day a couple of years ago he called me, we were just talking regularly, and the pills had just arrived at his house and we kind of made

a couple of jokes. "What do you mean pills arrived at your house?" And he explained, "In the case of a nuclear catastrophe I'm supposed to take this pill." We just laughed and laughed and laughed. Like, "What? They sent you pills? In a nuclear..." Anyway, it kind of planted a seed of, huh, there is this thing going on here, you know.

It reminded me of an American friend of mine who lived during the Cold War and they were taught in school, as you probably all know, to duck and cover in case the Russians attack. and just silly, silly things. So that's what brings me here, to voice my opinion as a citizen of this great country and say my opinion that there is no such thing as safe nuclear. I know I'm not an expert, just a normal citizen who loves his city, but that's my opinion. I know it's a nuanced issue. The folks over here obviously think it's a safe thing. Well, nothing is 100 percent safe, I understand that, so maybe my standard of safety is a little too high. The oil refineries in Alberta are unsafe, there are people who die on them, but what makes this different is the scope, you know. When a catastrophe happens in Alberta, people die. That's a horrible thing obviously, but the potential for disaster is nowhere, to my knowledge, larger than it is here in Pickering, given that this nuclear power plant is so close to so many people.

Now, earlier, yesterday I heard a lot of good reasons for the continued operation of the nuclear power plant and there are obviously a lot of smart people who are trying to make sure it's very safe and technical and I don't know anything about that, so I'm not going to comment, but the thing that they, to me, really pushed the continued operation, the reason, their argument is 5000 jobs and \$1.5 billion a year. In my opinion, it's simply not worth the risk even if that risk is only one in a million, which it might be even bigger than that because, well, you just can't put a price on the potential for disaster. That, knock on wood, hopefully won't happen. And anyway, I guess I will end there. Even if that risk is only one in a million, it's not worth the risk. Thank you.

THE PRESIDENT: Thank you.

Comments? Questions? Dr. Demeter...?

MEMBER DEMETER: Thank you for your intervention. Did you happen to be here during the discussion on earthquakes and fault lines? Part of your intervention talks a lot about, you know, concerns for earthquakes and stability and there was a relatively long discussion on earthquake potential, size, distance from the plant, the stability of the geology. I don't know if you heard that discussion yesterday -- I don't know if it was yesterday. It has been a blur, but yesterday or the day

before.

MR. AYAZI: I was here yesterday but I did not hear that. I guess you are obviously speaking about the submission that I sent. I had literally 100 different ideas of what to write about to you, because there are so many issues that I care about with this particular thing, so the earthquake was just one of many.

MEMBER DEMETER: Okay. If that is a particular concern, because we had someone I think on teleconference that talked about it, but the transcripts are available and you may want to look at the discussion on that particular facet of your intervention.

THE PRESIDENT: Okay. Thank you. Thank you for your intervention.

The next intervention is by Ms Guecha -- I don't know if I'm pronouncing that properly -- as outlined in CMD 18-H6.71 and H6.71A.

--- Pause

CMD 18-H6.71/18-H6.71A

Oral presentation by Estefany Guecha

MS GUECHA: Good evening, respected Members of the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission and authorities.

I am Estefany Guecha Sanchez. I am an international student who has many loved ones here, so I made the decision to come to Canada rather than other countries because of the safety that just Canada can provide nowadays. This was my perception of Canada until I knew of the existence of a nuclear plant with the potential capacity to end the life of not hundreds or thousands but millions of people. And worse, that most of the people don't know how to react if something happens. Today I am here to give you my reasons why you should not renew the licence of the Pickering nuclear plant.

So in my presentation I am going to show you three main points: the first one, why the lack of information is a serious problem; the second one, why the risks and costs are too elevated; and the third one, which alternatives you should take into account.

First, the lack of information. OPG says that its staff is trained, they have alarms and adequate equipment to deal with an emergency. I really want to believe that they are ready, but what about the people who might be affected? Here are two scenarios in which people know how to react and the scenario in which the people don't know.

The first one, the scenario where the people know how to react. Surely they can have the KI

pills that are given for free. But here I have a different question. Do these people really know the side effects of these pills? Because while I am not an expert, I know that these pills are not all good. I read before that they have some restrictions and side effects. So the people I have asked don't know much about it. They know that if an alarm sounds they should take the pills and the effect lasts 24 hours. But then what? It is worth mentioning that although people are informed and have the pills, when a nuclear accident occurs there is no guarantee that they will have the pills with them. And it is important that you know that ads that are used to spread about the existence of these pills are not enough, because although I have heard that in Pickering there is some publicity about them, I have never seen this publicity in Toronto.

Now, the second scenario, the scenario in which people don't know how to react. Here I have other questions. What happens with people who don't live in this area, like citizens, international students and tourists, but at the moment of an emergency they are located near the Pickering nuclear plant, either 10 kilometres or 50 kilometres? Here there are different hypothetical situations that could happen: that they don't have the pills, so they will die of radiation without any protection; that they can have access to the pills, but

this implies a risk if they take them without consulting before if their conditions allow them to take the pills, cases such as being pregnant; and they can access the pills and know their limitations, but they ignore their current health status, so they will not be certain whether they can take the pills or not.

In all these scenarios the problem is the lack of information and awareness about how to react and this is a void that continues to exist because during the months I have been here I'm afraid that many are not aware that an old nuclear Pickering plant is very close where they study, where they work and they live. They ignore the existence of this plant. And it's clear that it is a game of probabilities that would not exist in a scenario that you as a Commission decide to not renew the Pickering licence.

The second point, why the scenario without the Pickering nuclear plant is better. Here I'm going to explain to you why the argument of jobs is not enough. When there are economic interests, one of the main arguments of the industry is jobs. I cite this from experience, because in Columbia for years we have tried to ban asbestos. Today we are presenting our eighth Bill in the Congress of the Republic, but this has not been approved because there are economic interests involved.

They have preferred to delay the decision even though they know that asbestos is banned in more than 55 countries and that 320 Colombians die each year because of asbestos exposition. My message here for you is that a responsible government prioritizes the right to live and health of its inhabitants over any economic interests.

Regarding the employment argument, I will explain to you later, there are other better alternatives that involve job creation, but if the priority is the current workers I would like to know if by extending the OPG licence the retirement age of their workers would be extended too. Because we are talking about people that are working in a really high risk. Also, it is important to mention that unemployment is not a big problem here in Canada. According to the last official report, Ontario has the lowest percentage of unemployment in the country.

So my third point, there are other alternatives. This year was the 32nd anniversary of the Chernobyl disaster, the world's biggest nuclear disaster that took place in Ukraine when it was part of the Soviet Union. In my letter I wrote about how the Chernobyl nuclear plant shared several characteristics with the Pickering nuclear plant, such as the viable number of reactors and the age of the facilities. And after that nuclear accident, different countries, being aware of the

risk, have been taking the decision to shut down their nuclear plants. One of them was Germany and they are still working on that because shutting down and nuclear plant requires time and attention. And the sooner this process happens, the better.

The economic benefit of energy production is not an exclusive benefit of the nuclear industry. There are other better ways to generate energy without the risk and possibly cost in human life that an old nuclear plant like Pickering represents.

And the truth is that this nuclear plant is not an essential thing for Canada. According to the government's last report, Canada is the sixth largest energy producer and the fifth largest net exporter in the world. So the necessity of energy is not a reasonable argument to renew the licence of OPG that OPG is asking for.

There is a saying in my country that states: Those who forget their own story are condemned to repeat it. I don't think that it is necessary to wait until a tragedy happens to take measures. I truly believe that it is possible to learn from the mistakes of the past and here and there is an alternative that I want to present to you, because this year in Chernobyl they decided to start a solar farm where the accident of Chernobyl took

place in 1986. I think that after shutting down Pickering, Canada could do the same, and not only generates solar energy, wind power, too. As you know, Canada is already investing in clean energy technology. This kind of green energy is a good alternative, but besides being a more secure energy, it will represent a new resource of jobs and this cannot be ignored.

I would like to be able to develop more my arguments, but the time is short.

So in summary, I have shown you three things: first, why the emergency management is inadequate; second, why the cost of the risks is not reasonable; three, why there are benefits to migrating to other kinds of sources of energy.

Canada has been an example for the world in many aspects for years, but if the licence of this nuclear plant is renewed, the level of importance that this government gives to the security of its citizens will be questionable. And here it is important to say that every year there are more of us who come to Canada temporarily, either for tourism or for academic purposes. Last year there were 494,525 international students, 20 percent more than in 2016. According to the Canada Bureau for International Education, one of the top three reasons why students choose Canada is safety, but if we knew about the

old nuclear plant that continues to operate despite being so close to the population, we could well question how safe we are. A nuclear plant is a time bomb, the time of many is in your hands, so take the better decision, Commissioners, please shut down Pickering.

THE PRESIDENT: Thank you.

Question? Anybody have a question? Go ahead, Dr. Demeter.

MEMBER DEMETER: Thank you very much for your intervention. I think it's important. I'm not sure if Health Canada is still on the line or if someone can speak to the side effects or potential contraindications to KI pills. I think it is important to judge the safety of these pills to the general public. Knowing that there are different recommendations by different countries that are subtly different, I want to make sure to keep this in the Canadian context.

THE PRESIDENT: But I would also like to hear from OPG. I think that with the kit there was instructions about how to take it, who should take it, not everybody should take it, and when to take it. So I would like confirmation, but I hear somebody here wants to talk about the side effects.

DR. ZABLITSKA: Lydia Zablotska, for the record.

I am trained as a physician and also as an epidemiologist and I worked in Chernobyl since 1995 and heard a lot. And I did research in Chernobyl, so I know a lot about use of KI pills after Chernobyl. They were not distributed there in adequate amounts, so that didn't work, but in terms of the efficiency and side effects, we do have adequate data. And so the side effects are really small and they are less than 0.1 percent attributed in the literature. The side effects are very minor, irritation of the stomach. None of the big or really important side effects have been noted in the literature. There have been very big campaigns done in other European countries where they were distributed to more than a million people, in Poland for example, after Chernobyl and there were no really big side effects noted.

THE PRESIDENT: And there was a massive distribution in Japan.

DR. ZABLOTSKA: Yes.

THE PRESIDENT: Okay. So OPG...?

MR. MANLEY: Robin Manley, for the record.

So obviously, Dr. Zablotska knows lots more about that than I do. I would simply say that on the Prepare to be Safe website there is a Q&A that talks about the side effects and obviously we would agree.

THE PRESIDENT: So did you go on the

website to see if there are instructions on this?

MS GUECHA: Yes, I checked the side effects. But my point here is that people don't know about the side effects. Again, it's a problem of the lack of information that the people have.

THE PRESIDENT: Okay. Thank you.

Ms Penney...?

MEMBER PENNEY: Thanks for your intervention. And yes, I love interventions with pictures. A question for you about -- you said that you haven't seen any of the advertisements, you haven't heard and gotten any information. How should OPG and the Ontario government reach out to people your age?

MS GUECHA: How?

MEMBER PENNEY: Yes.

MS GUECHA: There are many ways. I think that nowadays what works more is with advertisement in social media. I think it could be Work Smart, but there are other channels, maybe with campaigns in the universities, in the language schools, because many people come here to study languages. There are a lot of students, international students, many students come here. So many of these students don't know anything about this nuclear plant or what to do if something happens, because they are just going to be here for a couple of months. So it is

important to focus your attention with this kind of population too, because if the citizens don't know how to react, what about the tourists and international students?

THE PRESIDENT: Questions? Anybody?

Okay. Thank you. Thank you for your intervention.

MS GUECHA: Thank you.

THE PRESIDENT: I understand that staff want to update us on something.

MR. FRAPPIER: Gerry Frappier, for the record. Yes, I would like to ask Mr. Jammal to talk a little bit about our plans going forward with respect to emergency preparedness and interactions with the province.

MR. JAMMAL: Thank you, Mr. Frappier. Ramzi Jammal, for the record.

A discussion this afternoon and for the last few days were going a little bit in circles with respect to the question from the Commission in specific on the capability of sensitive populations to obtain potassium iodide or KI pills in the designated ingestion control planning zone and in specific at any time.

What I am proposing to the Commission is we will -- CNSC staff is recommending we establish a working group that encompasses CNSC staff, OPG, the Ministry of Health and the Chief Health Officer, and then

other stakeholders in order to provide the Commission with a plan on the implementation of the requirement of 2.10.1, RD-2.10.1, and that we will be updating you with respect to the progress so that it will be clear to the responsible authority to deliver the KI pills when it is needed and then we will provide the Commission with the answers. And of course the final decision lies with the Commission with respect to direction.

THE PRESIDENT: So you had such a committee, a coordinating committee for the original KI. Are you talking about the same kind of committee or similar committee?

MR. JAMMAL: Ramzi Jammal, for the record. The answer is yes, a similar committee in order to -- with an outcome, with a recommendation for an execution of the strategy that currently exists so we have a detailed implementation plan.

THE PRESIDENT: Go ahead.

MEMBER PENNEY: Question. So do you need to update the Licence Condition Handbook to compel OPG to participate?

MR. JAMMAL: It's Ramzi Jammal, for the record. I do not need to update the LCH to compel OPG. We can order OPG. On a serious note, it will be a -- since I'm providing the Commission this recommendation, so it

will be in the Record of Decision as a direction for us to establish this work group and then we will execute according to your Record of Decision.

As we put in place the terms of reference and the outcome we will provide you the updates via the status report and, at minimum, the regulatory annual report, but we would prefer to provide you more frequent updates on the progress associated with it. So the endpoint is I commit to do it, so we are going to do it, it does not need to be in the LCH, but we can put it in the LCH based on the recommendation coming from the Commission.

THE PRESIDENT: OPG, do you want to make a comment?

MR. LOCKWOOD: Randy Lockwood, for the record.

No need to order, we would be pleased. And in fact, I firmly believe, as I stated earlier today, that in the unlikely event we had to implement such a plan, we could, otherwise we would not be sitting here. But what has become very clear, because I do agree with the earlier comments that we have talked many times in circles and if we have talked in circles that means it's not clear. And from day one I have committed that we will do the right thing and nuclear safety will be top priority no matter what. So it's not a case of ordering, we will lead it.

THE PRESIDENT: Okay. Thank you.

Ms Velshi...?

MEMBER VELSHI: This is really good news, so I commend you for making this happen, Mr. Jammal. You didn't mention the Office of the Fire Marshal and Emergency Management in the Working Group. Are they a member of this?

MR. JAMMAL: Ramzi Jammal, for the record.

It's my mistake. Even though I wrote them down I did not list them, but as part of the terms of reference we will list who the members will be and then we will be updating the Commission based on the progress we are going to make. So that's the problem by naming some and not all the others, but definitely the major stakeholders for the implementation will be engaged.

THE PRESIDENT: I'm sure there are going to be other players like Health Canada, maybe even Transportation, because you talk about logistics, it's going to be complicated. And some of the municipalities, Durham, et cetera.

MR. JAMMAL: Let's start with baby steps first and then we will scope-creep afterwards.

THE PRESIDENT: I am waiting for the first report.

--- Laughter / Rires

MR. JAMMAL: Okay. Thank you.

THE PRESIDENT: Okay.

MEMBER DEMETER: I just wanted to say I truly look forward to the report and the information. Thank you very much.

THE PRESIDENT: So I understand, Marc, you want to update us on the next --

MR. LEBLANC: Yes. We had one remaining intervenor tonight and the train he was taking to Pickering was cancelled. And we have evidence of it, not that we needed it, and so we accepted that Mr. Kalevar present tomorrow morning instead of this evening. So I think he will be here tomorrow in that regard. So this closes the evening.

So to give you a sense of how the day will unfold tomorrow, we only have three interventions. We have the Lake Ontario Waterkeeper, the Registered Nurses' Association and we have Mr. Kalevar that will be presenting. This will be followed by rounds of questions from the Members to OPG and CNSC staff and departments that are still available and we will have some departments available for the Lake Ontario Waterkeeper intervention that deals with several issues.

So good evening, enjoy it. It's rare to have a Commission proceeding that ends that early.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes. So we give you a free evening here. See you tomorrow.

--- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 6:59 p.m., to resume on Friday, June 29, 2018 at 8:30 a.m. /
L'audience est ajournée à 18 h 59, pour reprendre le vendredi 29 juin 2018 à 8 h 30