

Minutes of the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission (CNSC) Meeting held Friday, May 19, 2006 beginning at 1:44 p.m. in the Public Hearing Room, CNSC Offices, 280 Slater Street, Ottawa, Ontario.

Present:

A. Graham, Presiding Member

C.R. Barnes
J. Dosman
M.J. McDill

M.A. Leblanc, Secretary
P.D. Bourgeau, Recording Secretary
J. Lavoie, General Counsel

CNSC staff advisers were: P. Thompson, I. Grant and K. Lafrenière.

Other contributors were:

- Atomic Energy of Canada Limited: B. McGee and R. Cronk
- Ontario Power Generation Inc.: P. Tremblay and B. Duncan

Adoption of the Agenda

1. The revised agenda, CMD 06-M26.B, was adopted as presented.

Chair and Secretary

2. The Presiding Member chaired the meeting of the Commission, assisted by M.A. Leblanc, Secretary and P.D. Bourgeau, Recording Secretary.

Constitution

3. With the notice of meeting, CMD 06-M25, having been properly given and a quorum of Commission Members being present, the meeting was declared to be properly constituted.
4. Since the meeting of the Commission held April 26, 2006, Commission Member Documents CMD 06-M25 to CMD 06-M29 were distributed to the Members. These are further detailed in Appendix A of these minutes.

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5. The Members approved the minutes of the Commission Meeting held on April 26, 2006 (reference CMD 06-M27) without change.

Significant Development Report

6. Significant Development Report (SDR) no. 2006-4 (CMD 06-M28 to CMD 06-M28.C) was submitted by CNSC staff. The following information was added orally during the meeting.
7. With reference to section 4.1.3 in CMD 06-M28.B, regarding a fire at Atomic Energy of Canada Limited's (AECL) Chalk River Laboratories, AECL stated that there were no radiological consequences from the fire and that personal injuries were minor in nature.
8. AECL noted that it was in the process of hiring an external independent investigator qualified in forensic analysis to investigate the incident. AECL added that the results of the analysis will assist in developing appropriate long-term corrective actions.
9. The Commission inquired if the building was equipped with a sprinkler system and if it had been set off by the fire. AECL responded that the sprinkler system performed as designed and was the primary fire control system that helped contain the fire.
10. AECL added that the actions taken by the staff involved in the event, the design of the building, the fire sprinkler system, and other safety-related systems involved in containing the fire, including the response of its fire protection people, all contributed to mitigating the event.

11. The Commission sought further information on the response time of the fire response team. AECL responded that the dispatch was done one minute after the alarm sounded. The first vehicle arrived two minutes after the dispatch and another two vehicles were on the scene within five minutes. AECL stated that the initial fire was quickly extinguished and that the firefighters declared the fire fully extinguished an hour later.
12. The Commission sought further information with respect to how old the failed pressure regulator was and what were the measures in place to ensure that this equipment remains fit for service. AECL responded that this information will be part of the root cause analysis. In the mean time, AECL has quarantined the series of pressure regulating valves.
13. AECL also indicated that it has distributed precautionary bulletins to its entire staff and has shared information regarding the event with the industry through the CANDU Owner's Group.
14. CNSC staff stated that they will come back to the Commission with further information once it has reviewed AECL's root cause analysis.
15. With reference to section 4.1.4 in CMD 06-M28.B, regarding a worker injury at Ontario Power Generation Inc.'s (OPG) Darlington Nuclear Generating Station Unit 3, OPG stated that a hazard assessment was performed for this work prior to starting but neither the crew nor the supervisor had recognized the potential for a pinch point in this case.
16. The Commission sought further information from OPG whether a safety device might have prevented the injury. OPG responded that the employee was wearing the appropriate gloves for the nature of the work and that this would be addressed further in the root cause analysis.
17. The Commission enquired if the injured person was an employee of OPG or on contract. OPG responded that he was on the OPG payroll as a supplemental employee and covered by Worker's Compensation under the Workplace Safety and Insurance Board of Ontario.

ACTION

Status Report on Power Reactors

18. There were no updates to the Status Report on Power Reactors (CMD 06-M29).
19. The Commission sought further information regarding the nature of the forced maintenance outage at OPG's Pickering B nuclear generating station. The Commission is satisfied with the response received.
20. The Commission sought further information about the Point Lepreau nuclear generating station. CNSC staff responded that Point Lepreau is in their annual planned maintenance which is scheduled to last until the middle of June 2006.

Closure of the Public Meeting

21. The public meeting closed at 2:24 p.m. The Commission moved in camera to hear the Significant Development Reports relating to the prescribed security information contained in CMDs 06-M28, 06-M28.A and 06-M28.C.

Chair

Recording Secretary

Secretary

APPENDIX A

CMD	DATE	File No
06-M25	2006-04-18	(1-3-1-5)
Notice of meeting held on Friday, May 19, 2006 in Ottawa.		
06-M26	2006-05-02	(1-3-1-5)
Agenda of the meeting of the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission (CNSC) held in the public hearing room, 14th floor, 280 Slater Street, Ottawa, Ontario, on Friday, May 19, 2006.		
06-M26.A	2006-05-12	(1-3-1-5)
Updated Agenda of the meeting of the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission (CNSC) held in the public hearing room, 14th floor, 280 Slater Street, Ottawa, Ontario, on Friday, May 19, 2006.		
06-M26.B	2006-05-15	(1-3-1-5)
Updated Agenda of the meeting of the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission (CNSC) held in the public hearing room, 14th floor, 280 Slater Street, Ottawa, Ontario, on Friday, May 19, 2006.		
06-M27	2006-05-02	(1-3-1-5)
Approval of minutes of Commission meeting held April 26, 2006.		
06-M28	2006-05-01	(1-11-40-0)
Significant Development Report No. 2006-4 – Security Incident – Bruce Power Generating Station – April 11, 2006 – Contains prescribed security information and is not publicly available		
06-M28.A	2006-05-02	(1-11-40-0)
Significant Development Report No. 2006-4 – Security Incident – Point Lepreau Generating Station – March 8, 2006 - Contains prescribed security information and is not publicly available		
06-M28.B	2006-05-11	(1-3-1-5)
Significant Development Report No. 2006-4 – Supplementary Information – Atomic Energy of Canada Limited - Chalk River Laboratories Fire. Ontario Power Generation Inc. Darlington Unit 3 Outage: Worker Injury.		
06-M28.C	2006-05-15	(1-11-40-0)
Significant Development Report No. 2006-4 – Security Incident – Darlington Nuclear Generating Station – February 13, 2006 - Contains prescribed security information and is not publicly available		
06-M29	2006-05-02	(1-3-1-5)
Status Report on Power Reactors for the period of April 10 to May 2, 2006.		