Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission
CNSC's Nuclear Security Program
Introduction
Physical protection of major Canadian nuclear facilities and effective regulatory control over nuclear materials and radioactive sources are critical components of the security of Canada and the continental security of North America as a whole. The September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks in the United States highlighted a growing threat environment and the possibility of attacks against nuclear facilities or the diversion of radiological material to malevolent purposes This has resulted in increased attention to physical security in the nuclear sector.
Immediately following the attacks in the U.S., the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission (CNSC) moved:
- to undertake a rigorous review of, and to strengthen nuclear security in Canada;
- to review and revise its regulatory regime; and
- to reassess the safety and design of nuclear facilities.
Background
Since 2001, the CNSC has used Public Security and Anti-Terrorism (PSAT) funds allocated by the Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat (TBS), supplemented by core funds, to significantly strengthen its Nuclear Security Program (NSP). The objectives of the NSP are to ensure the physical protection of nuclear facilities, and the physical protection of nuclear materials in storage and transport. The CNSC pursues these objectives through a variety of activities relating to its core business of regulating, licensing and ensuring compliance.
In addition, NSP activities include establishing cooperative agreements and arrangements that support the core activities. In addition to the nuclear licensees, the NSP is implemented in close partnership with:
- law enforcement bodies and intelligence agencies;
- nuclear regulatory authorities of other countries; and
- multilateral agencies – particularly the International Atomic Energy Agency.
Annual NSP expenditures in recent years have approximated $1.3 million. The Nuclear Security Division (NSD), which takes the lead within the CNSC in relation to the NSP, accounts for the bulk of these expenditures.
Evaluation objectives
The objectives of the evaluation were to determine:
- the ongoing relevance of the NSP in the current environment;
- the extent to which the NSP’s objectives are being met;
- the effectiveness of the program’s management structures and processes, including governance, accountability and funding; and
- the nature and extent of opportunities that exist to improve NSP efficiency and effectiveness.
Evaluation Results
1. Program rationale and relevance
Prior to the events of September 11, 2001 (9/11) the CNSC had already recognized that a need for a review of provisions for physical security at nuclear facilities in Canada. It had commissioned a “Design Basis Threat” (DBT) study to determine the attributes and characteristics of potential adversaries to major nuclear facilities in Canada and had commenced a threat analysis. The latter was completed shortly after 9/11, culminating in a November 2001 report that outlined vulnerabilities in relation to newly identified threats. These efforts proved to be valuable points of departure for the enhanced nuclear security regime that began to emerge after the events of 9/11.
Compared with the situation before 9/11, the current perceived threat of terrorism is significantly higher, and is expected to continue to be high for the foreseeable future. As a result, the rationale for continuing a strong focus on the physical security of nuclear facilities and materials is clearer now than it has ever been.
2. Effectiveness and Success of the Program
Following 9/11, the CNSC used a risk-based approach to review security risks at all nuclear facilities and for all licensed activities. It then acted quickly to strengthen nuclear security, using a phased approach.
Phase 1 involved the issue of Commission Order 01-1 on 19 October 2001, requiring operators of nuclear power plants and Atomic Energy of Canada Limited to put in place significantly enhanced security measures. In Phase 2, the CNSC issued a Designated Officer Order (01-D1) in November 2001, requiring uranium refineries, nuclear fuel fabrication facilities and radioisotope processing facilities also to strengthen security. Phase 3 involved a January 2002 letter to all users of nuclear substances reminding them of their obligations under the General Nuclear Safety and Control Regulations and requesting them to review their security measures.
Security is now an important part of the licensing process, and a prominent factor in the Commission’s decisions regarding applications for new or renewed licenses. Appropriate nuclear security programs, providing protection against an updated DBT, are a license condition, and are detailed in license applications. The security programs are assessed closely by NSD staff, who advise the Commission on their appropriateness.
The enhanced security measures required of licensees have been accompanied by a strong compliance program, based in part on standards and guides developed by the CNSC. The evaluation found that the NSD has implemented a comprehensive, risk-based and well-documented promotion, verification and enforcement program. One important development is that its inspections now cover the full range of nuclear facilities and installations.
In addition to protecting nuclear facilities, one part of the NSP objectives deals with protecting nuclear materials during their transport and in storage. The CNSC has perceived a need to do more in this area, and is in the process of developing standards to address the security requirements of high-risk radioactive sources during transport as well as in storage. Another initiative involves enhancing the security of high-risk sealed sources to keep track of where they are, where they go and who gets them.
The CNSC, in partnership with the Department of Justice Canada, was in the process of redrafting the Nuclear Security Regulations to ensure they take full account of the new threat environment and are consistent with international recommendations and requirements. The amended regulations, once in force, will have the effect of setting aside Orders 01-1 and 01-D1. CNSC has indicated in May 2007 that it has entrenched the need for them in Canadian law by amending the relevant regulations.
CNSC senior management and NSP officials are of the view that, taking account of the Canadian environment, Canada is now on a par with the rest of the world when it comes to the physical security of nuclear facilities and of nuclear materials in storage and during transport. The evaluation found that particularly good progress has been made in the physical protection of higher-risk nuclear facilities. However, progress has also been made in improving and assessing physical security in lower-risk facilities and strengthening further the security of nuclear materials wherever they may be.
The available evidence is that licensees are satisfied with the CNSC’s exercise of its role. While there have been some complaints about the substantial investments licensees have had to make and the costs they have incurred, cooperation with CNSC has generally been good. For the most part, licensees have shown that they understand the reasons for the enhanced security requirements, and in some instances have even welcomed the changes.
3. Program Management
Moving forward, CNSC management’s intention now is to establish a coordinated policy and strategy with respect to nuclear security. There is a perceived need for a longer-term vision, and a strategy to support that vision – including a more coordinated approach to matters such as outreach, promotion, guidance, regulations, technical assessments and international cooperation. Among other things, such a vision and strategy recognizes that licensees’ have already made major investments in strengthening security and are justifiably apprehensive about what more may be required of them in the future, and will provide a firmer basis for relationships with licensees.
A CNSC reorganization effective 1 April, 2006 moved the reporting responsibility of the NSD from the Director General of Assessment and Analysis in the Operations Branch to the Director General of the newly-created Directorate of Security and Safeguards. One of the anticipated by-products of the reorganization is that it will bring more of the day-to-day management of most aspects of the NSP under one Director General, thereby providing the opportunity for coherent leadership. This evaluation is of the view that after a period of one to two years the CNSC should assess the success of the new organizational structure.
Senior CNSC managers believe that they (and the Commission) have the information needed to monitor progress and hold staff accountable for NSP results. Much of the information on progress goes through the Commission process to inform its decisions on applications for new or renewed licenses. Further, the Vice-President, Operations, meets regularly with the responsible Director General on nuclear security, as well as other matters. The Director General to whom the NSD reports has day-to-day contact with the NSD Director and can ask for performance information as and when required. For their part, NSD officials believe that they have senior management’s attention and support concerning the Nuclear Security Program.
4. Improving Program Performance
The CNSC has identified ways to improve the performance and management of the NSP and is moving ahead in some areas to effect improvements. This evaluation did not identify significant opportunities for improvement of which the CNSC is unaware.
Opportunities for improvement
The CNSC has identified opportunities for improvement in the following three areas as a result of its analysis of the Smart Border II initiative1 :
1. Enhancing secure trade through increased regulatory oversight of high-risk radiological sources and nuclear materials as they are produced, manufactured, stored, used and transported.
To this end, the CNSC has already developed the Sealed Source Tracking System and a secure network for storage of the tracking data and identified other initiatives it believes it should pursue, including putting in place agreements to harmonize export and import controls; verifying the legitimacy and reliability of transporters of nuclear materials; and implementing reliability verification processes of individuals who have unrestricted access to such sources and materials.
2. Implementing the means to evaluate and measure the effectiveness of armed response forces in making interventions in response to “attacks” by adversary forces that are as realistic as possible.
This can be achieved through a well-designed Force-on-Force performance testing program. The CNSC has begun to discuss and review U.S. Force-on-Force programs and has begun related consultations with the RCMP and the Department of National Defence.
3. Enhancing capacity for intelligence sharing and analysis.
This includes improved liaison and interaction with the Canadian Security Intelligence Service, the Communications Security Establishment and the RCMP, as well as with local law enforcement agencies that have nuclear facilities within their jurisdictions.
The CNSC has identified a lack of dedicated resources as the major barrier to improving the NSP’s performance, or at least to having greater certainty about that performance.
Conclusions
Following 9/11, CNSC moved quickly and decisively to ensure that physical security at Canada’s high-risk nuclear facilities would be strengthened. In doing so, it relied heavily on the PSAT funding made available by the government for a period of six years, ending after 2006-07.
This evaluation concludes that the basic regime for effective nuclear security is now largely in place. Moreover, that regime is significantly stronger, both in scope and depth, than that which existed before 9/11.
It is difficult in any evaluation to measure the performance of a program that is designed to prevent certain things from happening. It is a relatively simple matter to describe the activities that have been undertaken and the outputs that have been produced. In that regard, this evaluation shows that the regulatory regime is indeed consistent with assessed threats as well as international standards and practices, that CNSC issues licenses and regulatory approvals consistent with that regime, and that NSD’s promotion, verification and enforcement program shows, in general, good compliance by licensees.
Although this evaluation concludes that much has been done and achieved in the past four years, more remains to be done. The CNSC has identified the need, and has started to take steps, to improve the program in several areas. Further progress is constrained by a lack of dedicated resources (dollars as well as staff). However, the CNSC has made a submission to Treasury Board for additional funding and is awaiting the Treasury Board’s decision.
Management Response
Management has provided a response and action plan relating to the evaluation results identified:
General Disclaimer
Please note that information that would normally be withheld under the Access to Information Act or the Privacy Act does not appear in this report.
1The governments of Canada and the U.S agreed to a “Smart Border” declaration in December 2001, including commitment to an Action Plan for Creating a Secure and Smart Border. Many of the elements of the action plan are dependent upon the CNSC’s nuclear regulatory activities.
