

November 1, 2018

CNSC Consultation
Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission
PO Box 1046, Station B
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Ottawa, ON K1P 5S9

Subject: *Comments on REGDOC-3.1.3, Reporting Requirements for Class II Nuclear Facilities and Users of Prescribed Equipment, Nuclear Substances and Radiation Devices*

To whom it may concern;

The Radiation Safety Office at the University Health Network appreciates the opportunity to provide comments for the public consultation on REDGOC-3.1.3. Overall we are pleased with the efforts being made by the CNSC to clarify regulatory expectations for the licenced community. We anticipate that having reporting requirements from various regulations consolidated in single document will help reduce errors in reporting.

We have comments on the following four points in the REGDOC:

1. Table A, Section A: Authorized Activities, Item 1, *Contravention of the Nuclear Safety and Control Act (NSCA) in relation to an activity that is authorized.*

The guidance states that this includes non-compliances found during internal audits. As currently written this guidance is ambiguous. We recommend clarifying that this applies only to previously unobserved non-compliances that would have been reportable at the time they occurred, regardless of how much time has passed between the event and the internal audit.

2. Table A, Section D: Operating Performance, Item 8: *Failure, degradation or weakening of operating conditions*

The guidance in this section references *any incipient failure, abnormal degradation or weakening of security systems for Category 1, 2 or 3 sealed sources (i.e. alarm system is not working properly)*. The current interpretation from CNSC staff is that this includes a failure in procedure such as where a staff member forgets to arm a motion sensor. We feel that it stretches the definition of a “security system” to include a failure of procedure in this requirement. Such an occurrence is not the result of malicious intent and is not technically a “breach” of a security feature. It is therefore unlikely to constitute or contribute to a serious risk to the health and safety of persons. If the investigation reveals malicious intent then this should certainly be reported; however we feel the default requirement should not include an immediate notification for this type of event.

This section also uses the phrase “...that *could* result in a hazard to the health and safety of any person...” In order to maintain consistency with GNSCR 21 (1) (f), which is quoted in that section, it would be preferable to use a term such as “*likely*” or “*probable*” instead of “*could*.”

3. Table A, Section D: Operating Performance, Item 9b): *Event, notification or filing of specific records with the CNSC*

The guidance in this section states that spills less than 100 exemption quantity are not reportable. For greater clarity, we suggest that a caveat be added stating that a spill of less than 100 exemption quantity may be reportable if it leads to an event which *is* reportable, such as a spill leading to a skin dose above the CNSC reporting threshold.

4. In section 1.1, Purpose, the terms *situation, event* and *dangerous occurrence* are used. These are repeated in several other locations throughout the REGDOC, along with the term *contingency plan*. We would find it useful if the CNSC would provide definitions of these terms in the document.

Thank you for the continued opportunities to comment on regulatory documents such as this.

Sincerely,

Dave Niven