Regulatory Action - Cameco
Under the Nuclear Safety and Control Act and associated regulations, various levels of regulatory action can be taken by the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission (CNSC) to protect the health, safety and security of Canadians and the environment.
2012
- October 29, 2012: Update on Order issued to Cameco on Blind River Refinery incident
- September 18, 2012: Order to Cameco, Blind River Refinery
- August 24, 2012: Cameco's final investigation report (PDF) concerning the uranium contamination event at the Blind River Refinery on June 23, 2012 .
- July 20, 2012: CNSC's letter of response to Cameco (PDF), after reviewing Cameco's initial response of July 16, 2012 to the CNSC (PDF)
CNSC closes Order to Cameco, Blind River Refinery
October 29, 2012
On October 17th, Cameco submitted a work plan to address safety concerns associated with depressurizing drums containing yellow cake received from Uranium One Inc. (Willow Creek Facility) in the United States. This plan has been reviewed by CNSC staff and has been deemed acceptable. Accordingly, the Order has now been closed.
The basis of the Order was to protect workers' health and safety and the environment.
Order to Cameco, Blind River Refinery
September 18, 2012
On September 13th, a CNSC inspector was at the Cameco Blind River Refinery (BRR) to conduct a planned inspection of the facility, as part of CNSC’s routine compliance verification program.
The CNSC inspected the area where an incident occurred on June 23, 2012 concerning an indoor spill of uranium concentrate powder (yellow cake) that resulted from opening a pressurized drum containing yellow cake. The drum originated from Uranium One Inc. (Willow Creek Facility) in the United States. Interim corrective actions were also verified to prevent re-occurrence of such an event from happening with other yellow cake drums at BRR.
After the inspection, an Order under Section 35 (PDF) of the Nuclear Safety and Control Act was issued to Cameco BRR.
The order stipulates that Cameco shall not open any uranium concentrate drums received from Uranium One Inc. (Willow Creek Facility) until a safe work plan to depressurize the drums has been developed by Cameco and that the plan has been reviewed and deemed safe by a qualified third party, and is satisfactory to the CNSC staff.
The basis of the Order was to protect workers' health and safety and the environment.
August 24, 2012
Cameco's final investigation report (PDF) concerning the uranium contamination event at the Blind River Refinery on June 23, 2012.
July 12, 2012
CNSC request for information to Cameco
The CNSC is requesting all Canadian uranium mills review their operations and take a number of actions to minimize any potential for increased risks posed by the unintentional pressurization of a drum containing yellowcake, as result of a uranium contamination event at the Blind River Refinery on June 23, 2012. On July 12, 2012, the CNSC announced that a request for information had been issued, under subsection 12(2) of the General Nuclear Safety and Control Regulations, to Cameco Corporation’s uranium milling operations.
Related links
- July 12, 2012: Other CNSC 12.2 letter to Canadian uranium mill - Request for information to AREVA Resources Canada (PDF)
July 6, 2012
CNSC request for information to Cameco
On July 6, 2012, the CNSC announced that a request for information (PDF) had been issued, under subsection 12(2) of the General Nuclear Safety and Control Regulations, to Cameco regarding a uranium contamination event at the Blind River Refinery on June 23, 2012.
CNSC staff received a written notification from Cameco on June 25, 2012, about an incident of an indoor spill of uranium concentrate powder, commonly called yellowcake, which resulted in three workers being exposed to the uranium. Recognizing the health and safety significance of this contamination event to workers at the Blind River Refinery, CNSC staff request Cameco to submit the following information:
- Cameco’s analysis of the adequacy of its current practices of workers’ protection from exposures to airborne uranium at the Feed Sampling and Preparation circuit at the Blind River Refinery;
- Cameco’s analysis of the lessons learned from the medical aid and emergency response procedures followed for this incident;
- Cameco’s confirmation that appropriate interim corrective measures
(for example: mandatory use of respirators, and suspending processing of yellowcake received from Uranium One) for workers’ protection are now in place and will remain in place until permanent measures are implemented to prevent recurrence of this event; and - In consulting with the Uranium One’s Willow Creek facility, the root cause(s) found for the unexpected pressure generated inside the yellowcake drums, along with any corrections action(s) taken to prevent recurrence of this event.
July 16, 2012: Response from Cameco (PDF)
The CNSC is in contact with the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission on this matter as the yellowcake drum originated in the U.S.
Related link
2008
October 2008
Requests for Information to Cameco
In October 2008, CNSC staff sent two Requests for Information to Cameco asking them to provide the CNSC with a characterization of the current effluent discharge and a review of its effluent treatment and pipeline design for the Welcome Waste and Port Granby Waste Management Facilities. In addition, CNSC called for a detailed evaluation of the level of risk to human health and the environment.